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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and 
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE 
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendants, 
and : Case No. 196 95 
AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION 
and JEEP CORPORATION, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and STEPHEN WHITEHEAD 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs Stephen and Deborah Whitehead brought action to re-
cover damages for severe injuries sustained in an automobile acci-
dent occurring October 16, 1979, on Interstate 15 within Utah 
County. At the time of the accident, Deborah Whitehead was driving 
a Jeep Commando manufactured and sold by American Motors Corporation 
and Jeep Corporation. Stephen Whitehead was a passenger in the Jeep 
Commando which was struck from behind by a 1978 Oldsmobile driven 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by Larry Anderson who was employed by Variable Annuity Life Insur-
ance Company. Named as defendants were American Motors Corporation 
and Jeep Corporation (AMC/Jeep) on the theory of strict product 
liability; Larry Anderson on a negligence theory; and Variable 
Annuity Life Insurance Company (VALIC) on the theory of vicarious 
liability. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The action came to trial on October 17f 1983, before the Hon. 
J. Robert Bullock sitting with a jury. During the course of trial, 
plaintiff Deborah Whitehead settled her case against all the defen-
dants and the Court dismissed her complaint with prejudice. After 
three weeks of trial, the issues of liability and damages related 
to plaintiff Stephen Whitehead were submitted to the jury. On 
November 4, 1983, the jury found that the Jeep Commando, as manu-
factured by defendant AMC/Jeep, was defective to the extent that 
it was unreasonably dangerous to the purchaser or user, and that 
the defective condition of the Jeep as manufactured by the defendant 
was a proximate cause of the injuries to plaintiff Stephen Whitehead 
upon rollover of the vehicle on October 16, 1979. Judgment was 
entered on the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Stephen Whitehead 
and against all defendants in the total amount of $1,638,125.00. 
Based upon the answers of the jury apportioning the fault among the 
defendants, for purposes of contribution and claims and cross-claims 
between the defendants, AMC/Jeep was deemed 70% at fault, Larry 
-2-
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Anderson and VALIC were deemed 30% at fault, and no fault whatso-
ever was attributed to Deborah Whitehead. Judgment was entered 
November 8, 1983. (R. 1362-1364). Upon considering extensive argu-
ment and submitted briefs, the court denied AMC/Jeep's Motion for 
Judgment n.o.v., or in the Alternative for a New Trial. (R. 1642-
1644). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment of the 
lower court against defendants American Motors Corporation and Jeep 
Corporation. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Set forth below is a concise statement of facts giving rise 
to the cause of action heard by the lower court. Respondent em-
phatically refutes the material purported to be a Statement of 
Facts within Appellant AMC/Jeepfs brief for the reason that it is 
not in actuality a "statement of facts" but is an extremely argu-
mentative, lengthy and repetitious presentation of AMC/Jeep's ver-
sion of the trial proceedings. 
The facts are these. On October 16, 1979, on a clear after-
noon, Stephen Whitehead and his wife of one year Deborah Whitehead 
were driving a Jeep Commando south on Interstate 15 near Orem, 
Utah County, Utah. Although the vehicle was borrowed, Deborah 
Whitehead had driven it several times before. Stephen Whitehead 
had just completed his working day and the couple had arranged to 
-3-
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meet at a commuter parking area along the freeway. Because Deborah 
had prepared Stephen's dinner for himf she drove the vehicle while 
Stephen rode as a passenger in the right front seat. (R. 2145-2147, 
2155). 
While driving approximately 50-55 miles per hour, the Whiteheadfs 
vehicle was struck from behind by a 1978 Oldsmobile driven by Larry 
Anderson. (R. 2147, 2151). The Oldsmobile was moving at a speed 
of approximately 65-70 miles per hour. The right front of the 
Oldsmobile contacted the left rear of the Whitehead vehicle. The 
Commando went out of control and rolled over. (R. 2151, 2152). 
As a result of the collision and roll-over, Deborah Whitehead 
received multiple head and limb lacerations as well as various 
bruises and abrasions. (R. 2152). 
Stephen Whitehead was severely injured. He sustained injury to 
his spinal chord at the thorasic level of T-ll, (approximately 
four inches above the belt level), abrasions over his shoulders and 
* 
upper portion of his back, associated tenderness over the left 
shoulder, abrasions on his hands and shins, and a severely broken 
leg (femur bone). The injury to the spinal chord rendered Stephen 
Whitehead paralyzed from the waist down, permanently a paraplegic. 
(R. 2254-2257). Testimony related to the extent of Stephen 
Whitehead's injuries comprised nearly an entire day a trial and 
over 100 transcript pages. (R. 2195-2249, 2254-2313). 
Naming Larry Anderson as defendant, plaintiffs filed their 
original complaint on November 21, 1979, and through amended com-
plaint, subsequently added Anderson's employer VALIC and AMC/Jeep. 
-4-
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identical set of Interrogatories to American Motors which consti-
tuted the second set of Interrogatories to American Motors. (R. 
238-256), No answers were received. Two months later, on November 
12, 1981, plaintiff again filed a Motion to Compel. (R. 257-
261). AMC/Jeep failed to respond. A full nine months later, on 
August 4, 1982, plaintiff filed a Third Motion For Order Compelling 
Discovery. (R. 584-588). One year and five months had elapsed 
since plaintiff originally submitted its interrogatories. Finally, 
on August 16, 1982, Jeep Corporation filed answers to interrogatories; 
however, the answers of Jeep Corporation were totally specious. 
In essence, only six of the 43 interrogatories were answered. 
(R. 614-636). Immediately, on August 20, 1982, plaintiff filed a 
Motion to Strike Answer, or in Alternative, Motion to Compel. 
(R. 641-644). Thereafter, plaintiff filed a Motion For Protective 
Order on September 3, 1982, to bar other defendants from taking 
the deposition of plaintiff's experts before plaintiff was able 
to obtain answers to interrogatories or even the name of AMC/Jeepfs 
expert. (R. 656-658). 
After exhausting all possibilities of getting cooperation 
from the defendant, and in utter exasperation, plaintiff obtained 
a hearing before Judge Allen B. Sorensen, the original trial 
judge assigned to the case. On October 29, 1982, Judge Sorensen 
heard the plaintiff's motions. (R. 5007). At the hearing, attorney 
for AMC/Jeep stated to the court that "they [the client] say they 
have nothing more than what they have given . . . " Judge Sorensen 
stated, 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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computed it after the answers to interrogatories." To which the 
Court responded, "If he does that, I will order he give you that 
information 90 days before trial." (R. 5036). 
In essence, the Court ordered AMC/Jeep to answer some interroga-
tories within 30 days, some within 90 days, and in no case would 
AMC/Jeep be allowed to submit evidence related to the interroga-
tories asked not given to plaintiff 90 days before trial. 
On December 29, 1982, 60 days after the first hearing before 
Judge Sorensen, a hearing was held again. Counsel stated: 
Now we are now to December 29, 1982, 60 
days later, and we still do not have any 
of the information that the Court ordered 
Mr. Jensen to provide to us within 30 days. 
(R. 5059). 
The Court continued through each individual interrogatory not 
yet answered by AMC/Jeep. In addition, the Court ordered that no 
expert of AMC/Jeep could be allowed to testify unless the name and 
address were provided to opposing counsel within 30 days from hear-
ing, i.e. by January 29, 1983. (R. 5079, 5080). 
On October 7, 1983, ten days before trial, AMC/Jeep had still 
failed to comply with the Courtfs discovery orders and plaintiff, 
through a Motion In Limine, moved the Court to prohibit defendant 
AMC/Jeep from introducing any evidence pertaining to those certain 
interrogatories that defendant failed and purposely refused to answer 
in defiance of the Court's rulings. Plaintiff's Motion In Limine 
was comprised of 30 pages wherein plaintiff painstakingly set forth 
for Judge Bullock each of plaintiff's interrogatories, AMC/Jeep's 
-8-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- lorlemer • ' - • A,.- r 
i)\' W ' T^' * -.--•.-•: .* •• °L;.. ;r. :•. late-: .; leiendant's 
failure to substantively r-spono. -* ;6 3-i<N3.. [See Appendix 
for copy ^f Dl => i nt i f ^  f s Motion in 1 
. . - : .•;*. rer^nr-e t^^4" s :-n*- . : notober 7
 f " Q87. "Judge 
Bulloch con?i iered v.o pia-nti*4 ' *- M »" n -• v l^rendants ot- ~* J-
vente " *• * ; to
 r \ . . .-:d \ ^ recrond - K^;-
answers • i< terrogatories. The master va^ J: ^ cussed ir lno^tih 
between (.'o1.^* ^nd oounsei. T"he dou * t 
-•---_-;. * - ^ss-examinp, hi1*- +- asov; u; ••• .~s . -•- r :> 
comply wit -iiscover1, orcer-, VIC /J^ep -v^ - ^  to raise ^ . "-* ' s 
wtij.cn iicia . • • .' response * ; InteiLj'-
at^ries. .. ;*• u^ ] , .;\ onoeoeci, -j^ wf^  > . - r *vh*jre 'he san*j facto 
we re -r-o^ii^^fi >y lintifi' acnessr - <• *'••• = i ! masses 
c • - •_-:'• - r-nn^i ,
 : ^  4 - ^ ^ . . >;i , L, n s ,v\)ula be admis-
sible, < . r 
Piaxn^ * '-« ,- "-: r ri. JCI. <= *-^ *-a1 
fa. .lire f"^  ,:on *:iv Supreme Cour4- r nese ^an/ and materia: pre-
t r i a l "• •.? t : n r; 5- a n d • > r : *5 r •- ^  ^  ! ^  r ^  d - ^  ^  M C :e *• • ! - • ~ •
 K , - -
s: 11 t • * ; t - - j * t M e t1 . . 
wi* intj- vie -v-^nerit : knowledge of • i[< entire nroceedi i -. 
Brie^I". *-'"^ f o M ^ w : ^ ; = ; . . - • • - * - ^« 
c - -i , :y • • ^ ,• • *M** J^ep T-v r-- precludeo 
fro- i itr M L C : it j related evidence based i:nori its failur-.- * - • -. 
inform • _-• j. , var(Meness, o -rvr eautii, 
^r ^y speciiioaliy answering • ;ie nego1. ivv ,hat tne requested infor-
-9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
mation did not exist. In sum, through multiple court orders by two 
trial court judges, AMC/Jeep was precluded from introducing test 
results, testimony, or evidence related to: 
1) safety or lack of safety of the Commando as affected 
by (i) rollbars, (ii) roofs and doors, and (iii) general in-
stability causing rollovers; 
2) results of any AMC/Jeep1s investigation into acci-
dents, injuries or fatalities related to the Commando; 
3) any plans, blueprints, drawings or specifications 
related to the 1972 Jeep Commando; 
4) information concerning the center of gravity of the 
Jeep Commando as it may relate to rollover propensity or any 
other driving or steering characteristic; 
5) testing related to the handling qualities and 
characteristics of the Jeep Commando; 
6) testing which may have been performed pertaining 
to directional stability or handling characteristics of the 
Jeep Commando for years 1966-73; 
7) operational directional stability or handling 
characteristics; 
8) the track width, wheelbase, suspension system and 
cab enclosure of the Jeep Commando; 
mando. 
9) any test driving done by AMC/Jeep of the Jeep Com-
1 
For specific questions, answers, motions, orders and supple-
mental orders, see Appendix, setting forth plaintiff's Motion In 
Limine, R. at 1063-1092, Transcript of Proceedings before J. 
Sorensen, December 29, 1982, R. at 5057-5072, and plaintiff's 
Interrogatories to defendant American Motors Corporation, R. at 
238-246. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. Sanctions Imposed By The Trial Court As A Result of 
AMC/Jeep's Failure To Make Discovery Were Entirely 
Appropriate And Supported By Statutory And Case Law, 
The t r i J I court's .v;t:-iorit; to impose sanctions o-r--od ..pom n 
party's fa^l^r-r- - ^o^ply vi4-- --:ir^ — «,.-. ..<-- - - imvery 
:i s :o. ; • - . : : '*' c:ie rt.-i1', Hiii^s o£ 
Civil Procedure: 
RULE 3'"". t-AlLukh .. .'1AKE DISCOVERY: SAN-- . I • 
(o! Failure to Comply with Order. 
; ,:., Sanctions by Coi irt in Which 
Action is Pending. 
If a party . • . fails t 3 obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery, 
. . . the court in which the action 
is pending may make such orders . . . 
as are just, and among others the 
following: 
(B) An order refusing to 
allow the disobedient party to support 
or oppose designated claims or defenses, 
or prohibiting him from introducing 
designated matters in evidence; 
The failure to act described ii i this 
subdivision may not be excused on the 
ground that the discovery sought is 
objectionable unless the party failing 
act has applied for a protective order 
as provided by Rule 26(c), (Emphasis 
added.) 
The tn.3' ^"ur- " « *--^  *-- •
 L o 1IUp, ^ . .. 
:; • - ;<_ .-t .. ocovery proceedings is i;.nor:r not 
expressly conferred r^ st it if-* :. i nr ^ *; -_ LIL iaciiitat 
JLJ. c o u 5 • r -pn PL party den* n-
:es a c a . ^ u s nsregar.j ci ir- respons ioi . i t Les -n ;i sec very, 
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the trial court's choice of even extreme sanctions, such as dis-
missal of the action, is not an abuse of discretion. Discovery pro-
cedures are meaningless unless violation entails a penalty propor-
tionate to the gravity of the violation. Sanctions must be avail-
able to the trial court in appropriate cases where a party fails 
to comply with discovery orders, not merely to penalize those whose 
conduct may be deemed to warrant such sanction, but also to deter 
those who might be tempted to such conduct in absence of such a 
deterrent. When a party has displayed a bad faith approach to dis-
covery, it is not only proper, but imperative, that sanctions be 
imposed to preserve the integrity of judicial process and due pro-
cess for other litigants. 
In the instant case, the trial court imposed sanctions pur-
suant to subsection (B) of Rule 37(b)(2). 
Even more stringent sanctions imposed by the trial court have 
been upheld by the Utah Supreme Court. In W. W. & W. B. Gardner, 
Inc. v. Park W. Village, 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977), the plaintiff 
served the defendant a first set of interrogatories. Eight months 
later and again one month later, plaintiff served a third set of 
interrogatories along with requests for production and a request 
for admission of facts. Defendant failed to respond and, there-
fore, plaintiff filed a motion for a default judgment as a sanction 
pursuant to Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
motion was noticed for September 20, 1976. On September 15, 
1976, defendant served its response to the first set of interroga-
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to adequately respond to interrogatories: 
Sanctions for refusal to comply with an 
order of court or for failure to respond 
are set out in Rule 37, U.R.C.P., and are 
discretionary with the court. 
A discretionary determination may be "re-
viewed" only in the case of a "gross," "clear," 
"plain," "palpable," or "manifest" abuse 
v" discretion. 
In Ida -1 iuMla , ....... . , .. 1 •-. , , • r 1 
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1964), the offending party failed to comply with a pretrial discovery 
order to produce documents. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment against the offending party solely for disobeying that order. 
The Utah Supreme Court held: 
Whether the failure to comply with the 
court's order has been willful and whether 
the circumstances are so aggravated as to 
justify the action taken is primarily for 
the trial court to determine. Unless it is 
shown that his action is without support 
in the record, or is a plain abuse of dis-
cretion, it should not be disturbed. 
Court imposing even the most severe sanctions as a result of 
a party's failure to make discovery rely upon the United States 
Supreme Court decision in National Hockey League v. Metropolitan 
Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 96 S. Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 
(1976) (per curiam). There, respondents, plaintiffs in an anti-
trust action, failed for 17 months to respond to the satisfaction 
of the other parties or to the court to hundreds of interrogatories. 
In the face of stern admonishment by the trial court, further de-
lays occurred, yet the trial court refrained from imposing sanc-
tions since all parties were attempting to reach a settlement. 
Moreover, respondents, at whom the discovery was directed, changed 
counsel and claimed that the transition hindered their ability to 
comply. Finally, a frustrated trial judge dismissed their action 
finding "flagrant bad faith" and "callous disregard" of their 
responsibility. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's 
dismissal, concluding that in view of extenuating circumstances, 
there was insufficient basis for the trial court's action. In re 
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respond to orders requiring them to produce crash tests and blue-
prints of engine guards. The Court held that although striking 
defendants1 pleadings and granting a default judgment was a drastic 
sanction, it was nonetheless appropriate for flagrant violations 
of the discovery mechanism. 
This court must conclude that the defendants' 
actions have been evasive and deceptive. 
They have been willful and deliberate and 
they have been in bad faith and their 
actions have been merely calculated to delay, 
obfuscate and avoid legitimate disclosures 
and to turn the process for discovery in 
these courts into an endurance contest, and 
a total waste of judicial time and effort. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has so held. In Adams v. 
J. W. Jones Construction, 703 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1983), the court, 
applying identical procedural rules, held that where a party will-
fully fails to comply with the rules of discovery, dismissal with 
prejudice is proper. 
Appellate courts routinely and properly uphold the sanctions 
imposed by trial courts as a result of one party's failure to dis-
close. See e.g. Binyon v. Nesseth, 231 Kan. 381, 646 P.2d 1043 
(1982); Independent Mfg. Co. v. McGraw-Edison, 6 Kan. App. 2d 982, 
637 P.2d 431 (1981); Owen v. F. A. Buttrey Co., 627 P.2d 1233 
(Mont. 1981); Drickerson v. Drickerson, 604 P.2d 1082 (Alaska 1972). 
It is axiomatic that the trial court is granted broad discre-
tion in dealing with the imposition of discovery sanctions. See 
Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 133 Ariz. 348, 651 P.2d 876 (Ariz. App. 1982); 
JR Construction Co. v. Paddock Pool Const. Co., 128 Ariz. 343, 625 
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P.2d 932 (Ariz. App. 1981); Wong v. City and County of Honolulu, 
665 P.2d 157 (Ha. 1983); State v. Mai, 54 Or. App. 334, 634 P.2d 
1367, aff'd 656 P.2d 315 (1981); Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 
(Alaska 1970) . 
In Matter of Estate of Mora, 611 P.2d 842 (Wyo. 1980), the trial 
court ordered that witnesses or exhibits not named or listed within 
specified time would not be admissible. The appellate court upheld 
exclusion of evidence since "after two years in which to prepare 
for trial, the time set by the court for submission of instructions 
cannot be said to be unreasonable. Mora failed to comply with the 
time table set forth in the court order. The order was not arbitrary 
nor an abuse of discretion. [citation omitted]." 
The restrictions placed on AMC/Jeep by the trial court were 
by no means the most severe sanctions available to the trial judges. 
Many trial courts, faced with a similar factual situation, have ruled 
just as the trial judge did in the instant case. 
In Fouche v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 103 Idaho 249, 646 P.2d 
1020, review granted 659 P.2d 766 (Idaho App. 1982), the appellate 
court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding the mechanicfs accident reconstruction testimony where 
such expert testimony from the mechanic had not been timely dis-
closed in response to a continuing request for discovery. 
In Sequoia Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Halec Construction Co., 117 Ariz. 
11, 570 P.2d 782 (Ariz. App. 1977), the appellate court held that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion, in a suit for injuries 
-17-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sustained when a rollover protection structure on a leased tractor 
collapsed, in excluding testimony as to experiments performed 
with the tractor on the grounds that such testimony constituted a 
last minute surprise and would work a severe prejudice to other 
parties who had utilized every discovery procedure available to be 
fully prepared for every eventuality. 
The only question before this court related to the pretrial 
rulings restricting AMC/Jeep is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in making those rulings. As supported by Utah statute, 
Utah case law and opinions handed down by countless high courts from 
other jurisdictions, the trial court in the instant case did not 
as a matter of law, abuse its discretion in imposing moderate sanc-
tions as a result of AMC/Jeep's continuous failure to comply with 
discovery orders. 
Upon appellate review, the function of the 
reviewing court is not to put itself in the 
place of the trial court and to determine 
with hindsight what sanction, if any would 
have been most appropriate; . . . [citations 
omitted]. In the case at Bar, the trial 
judge dealt with the counsel; he was in a 
position to assess the [defendant's] claim 
of abuse of discovery; and he was in a posi-
tion to better estimate whether the [de-
fendant's] improper conduct was prejudicing 
the [plaintiff's] efforts at trial. We 
cannot conclude as a matter of law, that 
the trial judge abused his discretion . . . 
Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 715 (Wyo. 1980). See also Kelly 
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Sovereign Broadcasting, Inc., 606 P.2d 
1089 (Nev. 1980). 
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Finally, in the instant case is found the unique circumstance 
of having had two trial judges rule on AMC/Jeep1s failure to make 
discovery. The pretrial rulings on October 29, 1982, and December 
29, 1982, were rendered by the Hon. Allen B. Sorensen and upon his 
retirement, the pretrial rulings related to discovery were rendered 
by the Hon. J. Robert Bullock just prior to trial. In both instances 
the trial judges felt it necessary to compel AMC/Jeep to comply with 
discovery orders and upon its failure to do so, issued the appropriate 
sanction. This cannot be found to be an abuse of discretion. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS WERE 
PROPER. 
The appellants have criticized the trial court's evidentiary 
rulings under three points, generally stated as Point I, regarding 
the introduction of irrelevant and inflamatory evidence; Point II, 
claiming the trial court prevented the defendants AMC/Jeep from cross-
examining plaintiff's experts; and Point III, regarding claimed exclusic 
of substantial portions of AMC/Jeep's evidence. The appellants' 
arguments are tainted by the failure of the appellants to give 
the foundational basis for the court's rulings in each instance 
and for taking substantial license with the record. The only way 
in which the respondents can address these blatant assertions of 
error is to take each specific contention and address it as it 
was raised in the appellant's brief. That we will do as follows: 
A. Appellant's Objections To The Admissibility Of The 
Dynamic Science Film. 
The first assertion of the appellants is that the Dynamic 
-19-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Science film prepared for the Insurance Institute of Highway 
Safety was irrelevant and referred to conditions and maneuvers 
never shown to bear any relationship to the accident. The appellants 
fail to refer to the foundational background to the introduction 
of this film. The record will disclose that a Motion in Limine 
was made by the plaintiffs on October 7, 1983. The court and all 
of the parties were given an opportunity in advance of trial to 
review the movie developed by Dynamic Science. 
The appellants quote extensively from their own objections 
to the introduction of the film addressed to the plaintiffs' 
Motion in Limine. The quotation from its own objection is misleading, 
since the manner in which the film was introduced in this case 
was vastly different than the commentary made in the appellants1 
objection, which it now quotes as authoritative. For example, a 
preview was held before the court with counsel and outside the 
presence of the jury, (R. 2982) and the portions of the film 
showing the movements of dummies in the machine were deleted and 
the film portrayal presented to the jury was drastically edited. 
Mr. Noettl testified that the CJ-5 on the film demonstrated 
handling reactions substantially similar to the manner in which 
the Jeep Commando would respond under circumstances and conditions 
prevalent in this accident. Mr. Noettl's qualifications regarding 
experience, his technical training, his knowledge of the jeep 
vehicle, and the creation of the film in question was thoroughly 
and carefully laid over fifteen pages of transcript (R. 2951 
'through 2966). 
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In the course of that testimony Mr. Noettl was required to 
tell of the handling characteristics of the CJ-5, CJ-6 and CJ-7. 
This Court should bear in mind that the Commando vehicle in this 
case is basically a CJ-6 and there is no dispute as to that 
nomenclature. Mr. Noettl indicated that there was virtually no 
difference between the parameters effecting the rollover characteristics 
of the CJ vehicle shown in the film and the subject Jeep Commando. 
He testified, 
"there were virtually no differences in my 
opinion between those parameters, that is 
the width of the track, the dimensions you 
would get when you measure the center line 
of one tire to the center line of the tire on 
the other side, the front and rear, and the 
height of the center of gravity of the vehicles." 
(R. 2962). 
He stated that in his opinion the rollover characteristics of the 
CJ-5 were the same as the rollover characteristics of the Jeep 
Commando. (R. 2964 and 2987) He indicated that many tests were 
made of the vehicle, but the tests that were appropriate for 
conditions basically similar to that giving rise to this litigation 
were the J Turn and the obstacle avoidance maneuver. (R. 2972) 
Adequate foundation was laid to show that Mr. Noettl knew the 
circumstances and conditions of this accident, had visited the 
scene of the accident, had seen photographs of the vehicle taken 
shortly after the accident and he, himself, had been qualified as 
an expert accident reconstructionist and an expert on the jeep 
vehicle. The witness testified that the film was material, for 
it demonstrated the rollover threshhold of the Jeep Commando 
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under circumstances similar to that which occurred on the day and 
place of the accident. The handling characteristics of the Jeep 
in the film were further related to the accident by the testimony 
of Mrs. Whitehead and by the subsequent testimony of Messrs. Shaw 
and Anderson. 
Mr. Noettl said that of the four hundred test runs made of 
the jeep vehicle, seventy to eighty percent were to check out 
instrumentation. (R. 2991) Only six runs were made to develop 
its rollover characteristics and those runs, as edited to the re-
quirements of the court, were shown to the jury. (R. 2992) The 
jury was specifically instructed that the plaintiff did not 
contend that the dummy sitting in the vehicle in one portion of 
the film represented the movement of people in real life, nor the 
movement of passengers inside the vehicle. (R. 2993) The film 
demonstrated that the CJ-5 in a J-turn maneuver on a straight 
highway would roll over at 22 miles per hour. (R. 2994) In the 
obstacle avoidance maneuver, the machine rolled over at 31 and 32 
miles per hour. (R. 2994) Mr. Noettl testified that because of 
its handling and its rollover propensity, the 1972 Jeep Commando 
was defective at the date of manufacture. (R. 2995) He testified 
that the Jeep Commando vehicle would operate identically to the 
CJ-5 shown in the film. (R. 2968, 2969) Mr. Noettl testified 
upon cross examination regarding the J-turn and obstacle avoidance 
maneuvers and how they related to ordinary traffic circumstances 
one experienced every day and he stated, "I would say, based on 
our testing, all the testing I have done, that the likelihood of 
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the vehicle rolling over is very, very high when doing those 
types of maneuvers." (R. 3010) Cross examination was intense 
and lengthy, but did nothing to shake the opinion of the expert 
that the Jeep Commando was defective when manufactured and his 
last statement to Mr. Jensen was, "If a vehicle has the same 
track width and the same height and center of gravity, it will 
exhibit very closely the rollover threshhold exhibited by the CJ 
vehicles." (R. 3025) 
Mr. Noettl testified that if it weren't for the rollover 
propensities of the vehicle as demonstrated by the film, the jeep 
would not have rolled upon the relative speed impact of 15 miles 
an hour between the Oldsmobile of Mr. Anderson and the Jeep 
driven by Mrs. Whitehead. (R. 3030) The rollover propensity of 
the CJ vehicle shown in the film and which had been tied to the 
Jeep Commando in the accident had met the evidentiary foundational 
requirement. How the appellants can contend after reading the 
transcript of Mr. Noettl1s testimony that he was allowed to testify 
without foundation that the CJ-5 and Commando were identical for 
purposes of handling characteristics, is beyond belief. If ever 
there was an adequate foundation laid for the admission of this 
testimony and the presentation of the film, it was in this case. 
Not only is there an adequate foundation, it might be said that 
the foundation was overwhelming and it certainly went to the 
heart of the issue. Relevancy cannot be a factor. The objection 
of the appellants in this case is simply without merit. 
-23-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The appellants would have the Court prefer the view of 
AMC/Jeepfs expert Heitz'man over the view of the plaintiff's 
experts, Noettl, Shaw and Anderson. Appellants presume that the 
jury and the Supreme Court are compelled to discard the plaintiff's 
expert testimony and believe that proffered by the appellants. 
If that were so, then, of course, the appellants would be entitled 
to judgment; however, the law is to the contrary: 
Where there is a discrepancy in the testimony 
rendered by witnesses the fact finder must 
decide which account is the most accurate and 
on appeal the Supreme Court must review the 
facts in a light most favorable to the pre-
vailing party. 
Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979). 
In regard to the admission of evidence, such as the film in 
question, broad latitude is given to the trier of fact. All evi-
dentiary matters were contested and certainly those which went to 
the heart of the question upon which there is opposing expert 
opinion, were contested. It is for this reason that the trial 
court's view of the testimony is so distinctly superior and so 
highly valued at the appellate court level. Our Court has said: 
In situations where exercise of discretion is 
appropriate considerable weight should be 
given to determination of the trial court due 
to the trial court's close involvement with 
the parties, the witnesses and the total 
circumstance of the case. 
Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974). 
Our court is not alone in its interpretation of the rulings of 
the trial court. The position of the Utah court is the general 
rule which has been effectively stated as follows: 
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Considering the full record we do not have 
the definite confirmed conviction that the 
court below committed a clear error of judg-
ment in the conclusion it reached upon weigh-
ing of the relevant factors that is required 
to reverse the judgment. 
Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 561 F.2d 506. 
All of the arguments made by appellants regarding the film are 
arguments to the weight of the testimony. The flaws in the film as 
viewed by the appellants were covered by the testimony of appellants' 
experts and, in fact, most of the appellants' quotes to the record 
are not from the testimony of plaintiff's experts but from the 
testimony of the defendants' expert, consequently, the jury had a 
full view of the relevance and materiality of the testimony and 
could attach such weight as it desired to the testimony of the 
plaintiff's expert, vis-a-vis, the testimony of the defendants' 
expert. 
The repeated assertions that the film was "especially pre-
pared" to accentuate rollovers and that the tests were "completely 
unrealistic" is not testimony of the plaintiff's expert but is 
testimony of the defendants' expert, which the jury was free to 
believe or disbelieve and which would materially affect the be-
lievability of the plaintiff's experts and in particular Mr. Noettl* 
Arguments that four hundred "runs of the CJ-5 were made but only 
six were shown" is deceptive when the record shows that full 
revelation was made to the jury that 80% of the runs were made for 
the purpose of testing equipment and not for the purpose of testing 
the vehicle and that only six of the runs shown in this Dynamic 
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Science film were related to rollover propensities. (R. 2994) 
All of those rollover propensity film tests were shown to the jury 
as edited to meet the admissibility requirements laid down by the 
trial judge. 
The appellants rely heavily upon Haynes v. American Motorsf 
691 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1982). The difficulty with that reliance 
is that the view is inapropos to the issue in this case. In 
Haynes, Jeep T-V commercials were offered for the purpose of showing 
actionable misrepresentation not for the purpose of showing handling 
characteristics. The commercials were of another vehicle which the 
plaintiff did not contend was similar. The key, of course, is the 
fact that the question of admissibility is based upon the founda-
tion that is laid, not upon the witness who is testifying. The 
court in Haynes was probably right in its ruling, but there can be 
no correlation of the facts in Haynes to the facts in this case 
regarding the foundation laid for the admissibility of the testi-
mony or the point to which the testimony was to be admitted. We 
simply say the Haynes case is not in point. 
To summarize the arguments of the plaintiff in regard to the 
defendants1 Point I, it could be said that the motion for the 
introduction of the film was made in advance of trial, the film 
itself had been in the hands of AMC/Jeep prior to coming into the 
possession of the plaintiff, the film was shown to all counsel in 
advance of trial and was reviewed by the court, not only before 
trial but immediately prior to the exhibition to the jury. All 
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objections were made and appropriate rulings were made to avoid 
misleading or inflaming the jury, so that the film as seen by the 
jury was directly material and relevant. 
The arguments made by the appellants herein are primarily to 
the weight of the testimony, vis-a-vis the relevance and material-
ity of the testimony. Every issue which it contends affected the 
believability of the film was covered by the appellants1 experts 
who were given broad license by the court to interpret, criticize 
and impugn the film and its relationship to the issues involved in 
this litigation. The admission of the film was not error. 
B. Appellant's Contention That The Trial Court Failed To 
Allow AMC/Jeep To Cross-Examine Plaintifffs Experts. 
The theme of this point, as presented by the appellants, 
stretches the parameters of propriety. The appellants apparently 
believe, for a reason unexplained in the argument, that the trial 
court "consistently refused to allow AMC/Jeep to cross-examine 
plaintiff's experts in any meaningful way." (Appellants' Brief p. 
37) The appellants' denegration of the trial court is further ag-
gravated by their comment "indeed, AMC/Jeep contends that the trial 
court abandoned any pretext of impartiality during the course of 
the trial and the jury was permitted to hear only one side of this 
case." (Appellants' Brief p. 3) 
The court in this case was one of the state's most experienced 
and respected jurists. His position in legal circles and his 
prominence among his colleagues, both before and after appointment 
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to the benchf is known to every practicing lawyer and judge in the 
state. Does one assume by appellants1 comments that the judge was 
motivated by something other than facts and the law? 
On pages 36 and 37 of their brieff the appellants make a com-
plaint that plaintiff was allowed to make a comparison between the 
Jeep and another passenger car and that the appellants were denied 
a similar right. The appellants refer the court to R. 2331-2332 in 
support of this contention. The fact is that the reference is to a 
voir dire examination by the appellants1 counsel wherein any compar-
ison made was as a result of his questions. Furthermore, the issue 
in that particular scenerio was whether the collision between the 
Oldsmobile and Jeep would have a particular affect upon a Jeep and 
if so, why. The issue was not as suggested by the appellants, a 
hypothetical comparison between Jeeps and passenger cars in general. 
The appellants1 Point II is disjointed, and topics are inter-
mingled, however, again on page 37 of appellants1 brief, they com-
plain of being "blocked" on cross-examination. 
The references shown on page 37 of appellants1 brief are not 
to the record but apparently to the transcript page numbers. A 
simple purview of the record cited by appellants will demonstrate 
that appellants1 counsel was not blocked on voir dire and cross-
examination. 
AMC/Jeep was allowed to voir dire Officer Knight on three sep-
arate occasions during plaintiff's direct examination (R. 2327-2329; 
2332-2333; 2342-2343) and to cross-examine four times covering 19 
-28-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pages (R. 2346-2352, 2357-2361, 2363-2370, 2373-2374). There was not 
one objection to appellants1 cross-examination that was sustained. 
In regard to the plaintiff's expert Anderson, the appellants 
requested voir dire once (R. 2680-2681) and cross-examination covered 
101 pages of transcript. (R. 2709-2797, 2818-2827, 2832-2833). The 
court allowed the appellants great latitude in examination and 
nothing in the record could be considered a "block". 
We have heretofore referred to Mr. Noettl's testimony and have 
demonstrated the sizeable amount of examination afforded the appell-
ants. To put it in terms of specifics, however, the record shows 
that cross-examination covered 41 pages. (R. 2998-3025, 3043-3053, 
3057-3058). This cannot be considered a "block". Furthermore, it 
should be remembered that the other defendants were also allowed ex-
tensive cross-examination. 
In regard to the plaintiff's expert Shaw, the appellants were 
allowed to voir dire four times. Voir dire by AMC/Jeep covered 15 
transcript pages. AMC/Jeep's extensive cross-examination of Shaw 
resulted in over 114 transcript pages. (R. 2438-2439, 2449-2457, 
2471-2472, 2484; R. 2496-2565, 2591-2624, 2634-2643). 
To illustrate AMC/Jeep's contention of blockage of cross-
examination as it speficially relates to Mr. Shaw's testimony, AMC/Jeep 
refers the Court to the testimony between 672 and 679 (R. 2450-2457). 
The fact is, on 672 (R. 2449), Mr. Jensen commenced a voir dire ex-
amination authorized by the court and which ended voluntarily on page 
679 (R. 2457). The court was lenient and tolerant of the questions 
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asked. Plaintiff's only objection to the extensive voir dire examin-
ation now complained of by the appellants is registered on R. 2454. 
That objection was overruled. 
Unfortunately for AMC/Jeep the responses developed by this 
voir dire examination clearly developed that the CJ-5 and the CJ-6 
(Commando) were identical. How that constitutes a "block" is 
beyond comprehension. 
Taking up the appellants1 next example of blocking cross-
examination, they cite to R. 4909 which refers to a preliminary 
hearing before trial wherein the admissibility of Noettl's film was 
discussed. The reference is properly under the appellants1 Point 
I, but since it has been raised under Point II, suffice it to say 
that the colloquy is primarily regarding the appellants' objection 
to the admissibility of the Noettl film and to a great extent is 
between Mr. Hanni, counsel for Anderson, and Mr. Jensen. The court 
allowed extensive argument after which the court, having fairly 
considered the admissibility of the film, stated, "Well, I'll let 
you get at it any way you want to by cross-examination or whatever, 
but I'm going to admit it. I'll overrule your objection with 
respect to those films." How counsel can describe this as "blocking" 
meaningful cross-examination is likewise a mystery. 
Reference to page 894 of the transcript shows no objection 
whatever (R. 2674). Likewise, page 896 (R. 2676). Likewise page 
897 (R. 2677); pages 10, 1040 (R. 2818, 2819) is recross-examination 
by Mr. Jensen. The record as cited by the appellants shows total 
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latitude on the part of the court. 
The court allowed cross-examination to the edge of contempt. 
As hereinafter discussed, the court granted the respondent's pretrial 
motion ordering the litigants not to mention seat belts or restraints 
until certain foundation evidence was proffered to the court. The 
appellants now contend that the enforcement of that ruling was a 
"block" to cross-examination. On page 1040 (R. 2819), counsel for 
appellants purposely and in direct contravention of the order of 
the court granting the plaintiff's Motion in Limine, stated: 
MR. JENSEN: You mentioned restraints. What 
are you talking about?" 
MR. HOWARD: Now your Honor, I object to 
that. 
THE COURT SUSTAINED. 
MR. JENSEN: We'll make a proffer, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Counsel for appellants then recognizing the violation and catching 
the sensitivity of the court, proceeded no further along that line. 
He was given the opportunity to make a proffer, which he did not 
make. The examination violated the preliminary ruling of the court 
and any examination along this line before that jury would have 
been prejudicial error. All of the parties knew it and counsel for 
the appellants had to recognize that he was on dangerous ground. 
How does that constitute "blocking" the appellants from cross-
examining in a "meaningful way"? Does "meaningful way" mean to 
-31-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
violate the rulings of the court or to infuse reversible error into 
the record? 
The substance of the "explicit point" complained of by the 
appellants on page 37 of their brief has shown that they all fit in 
the same category of testimony elicited by the appellants them-
selves or from objections sustained by the court because of vio-
lation of the court's rulings, but under no circumstance was an 
objection sustained that the appellants did not have adequate 
opportunity to address, given an opportunity to present contrary 
evidence or make a proffer of proof. A good many of the objections 
complained of occurred on appellants1 "voir dire" examination. 
None of the citations made by the appellants show any abuse of the 
appellants by the trial court, but to the contrary, demonstrate 
patience and tolerance with appellants' counsel by the trial court 
beyond that which the appellants deserved and which might have been 
reasonable. If there is any fault to be levied against the trial 
court it was its continued patience with appellants' counsel under 
circumstances that bordered on contempt. This cannot constitute a 
deprivation of a right to cross-examine. 
Counsel again refers to the record at 3043 as being indicative 
of the court's blocking meaningful cross-examination. Again we 
are back to the same area of the record referred to in appellants' 
Point I. Mr. Jensen is cross-examining the witness. It is he who 
wants to have the witness go into other vehicles, not the plain-
tiff. In his cross-examination he is asking questions such as "Is 
it difficult to roll over utility vehicles?" (R. 3043) Over ob-
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jections, the witness is allowed to state: 
Q. Mr. Noettl, you indicated that it was 
difficult to roll over a passenger vehicle? 
A. Yesf under the conditions I think I tried 
to describe, a flat surface, steering input, 
only, yes. 
Q. What experience have you had in trying to 
roll over a passenger vehicle? 
MR. JOHNSON: Object on the basis of rele-
vancy . 
THE COURT: I don *t want to get into testing 
all other kinds of vehicles, because we've 
got enough problems with the one. So, I'm 
going to sustain the objection. 
Q. (By Mr. Jensen) Is it difficult to roll 
over utility vehicles? 
MR. JOHNSON: Object, without the same con-
ditions. If he wants to make a point as it 
relates to similar vehicles under the circum-
stances -
THE COURT: Yes, I'm going to require that 
you define the question -
MR. JENSEN: I don't know how I get through 
the credibility, Your Honor, of a man who 
says something about one vehicle and we can't 
look at anything he's done or knows about 
other vehicles. We'll submit it. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to permit it, and 
subject to a motion to strike if it doesn't 
go to credibility. 
Q. (By Mr. Jensen) Is it difficult to turn 
over, roll over, utility vehicles? 
A. Well, in my opinion the difficulty would 
be increased, would be more than the CJ 
vehicles. Probably somewhat less than a 
passenger car, though. It would be somewhat 
less difficult than a passenger car. 
0. In the same range? 
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A. As what? 
Q. As the CJ, same range of difficulty? 
A. I don't know if I understand your 
question. Maybe -
MR. JOHNSON: I might be totally oblivious to 
it, but if this goes to credibility, I cannot 
see it. 
THE COURT: All right. You'll have your 
opportunity for a motion to strike, but you 
may proceed. 
MR. JENSEN: All right. 
Q. (By Mr. Jensen) You say it's more diffi-
cult to roll over some other utility vehicle 
comparing a CJ to another utility vehicle in 
its class? 
A. That would be my opinion, yes. 
Counsel goes on and continues to examine the witness through 
page 3052. The court overruled every objection made by the plaintiff 
but one, and that was to the question of an occupant protection 
standard that was not in effect at the time of the accident and to 
which Mr. Jensen was attempting to cross-examine. Except for that, 
the cross-examination was entirely in favor of the appellants and 
to the greatest part over the objection of the plaintiff. To now 
accuse the court of blocking the appellants' meaningful cross-
examination is incredible. 
In the interest of brevity, because the factual contentions 
have been addressed, be it said that arguments of the appellants in 
regard to this point are simply that. The appellants have failed 
to show by one reference to the record that there was any failure 
of the court to give fair treatment to the appellants. Rulings of 
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this court in this regard on evidentiary matters are adequately 
cited under Part A above; however, rulings of appellate courts in 
this area are legend to the effect that the trial court has broad 
discretion: 
The Supreme Court accepts the version of 
facts of a party in whose favor a jury 
verdict was rendered and reviews evidence and 
all inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom 
in light most favorable to him. 
Smith v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 344 (1965), 400 P.2d 570. 
The trial court has broad discretion in 
rulings admitting or rejecting evidence in 
the course of a long and difficult trial and 
those orders will not be disturbed unless 
clear abuse of discretion appears and pre-
judice results therefrom. 
Sequoia Mfg. Co. v. Halel Construction Co., 570 P.2d 782 (Ariz. 
1977). 
Addressing the Todorovich case referred to on page 40 of the 
appellants1 brief (Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 
(Wyo. 1978)) the respondent respectfully suggests that the case 
is not in point. Certainly one could not quarrel with the conclusion 
reached by the Wyoming Supreme Court, however, there is nothing 
in that case which is similar. The respondent respectfully suggests 
that in Todorovich, there was no violation of a previous ruling of 
the court by Chrysler's counsel. The Supreme Court of Wyoming simply 
said that the issue had been raised by the plaintiff and to which 
the respondent Chrysler had a right to cross-examine. Furthermore, 
the issue was a defectively designed seat which went directly to 
the question of causation, vis-a-vis the seat belt question which 
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the court in this case had determined not to be related to proximate 
cause or to mitigation of damages. See respondent's argument Point 
IV infra. 
In the cross-examination of Mr. Noettl by Mr. Jensen that we 
have already referred to and which is again referred to in 
appellants1 brief as R. 3043, Mr. Jensen is allowed to re-cross 
the witness, which he did for twelve pages of transcript and 
which he augmented by a re-re-re-cross-examination. He was 
allowed to ask every question related to his theory of the case 
except he was prevented from cross-examination of Mr. Noettl in 
regard to Federal Safety Standard 208. The reason that he was 
denied permission to go into Standard 208 is that it was outside 
of the scope of direct examination. The plaintiff had not referred 
to it in any of the questions asked of Mr. Noettl or of any other 
witness. Further, it was in contravention of the Pretrial Order 
pertaining to internal retention devices, e.g. safety belts. By 
a left-handed technique, counsel for the appellants was attempting 
to interject the failure of Mr. Whitehead to use a safety belt, 
notwithstanding the fact that he had been repeatedly warned by 
the court to stay away from that issue, in light of the court's 
ruling on the Motion in Limine. Knowing that Standard 208 related 
to restraint systems and seat belts and knowing further that the 
trial court did not understand that fact, the colloquy which appel-
lants claim as a blockage of meaningful cross-examination is as 
follows: 
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Q. (By Mr. Jensen) Well, you told Mr. Hanni 
that you thought there were practically no 
safety standards applicable, that may be 
overstating it, that there were relatively 
few federal standards that applied to utility 
vehicles and a lot or more that applied to 
passenger vehicles. Now, is there something 
besides brakes and roofs? 
A. Yes. A Standard 208, which covers 
occupant protection, doesn't apply to the 
utility vehicles, door retention standards. 
Q. 1972? 
A. It does not, yes, apply. 
Q. What are you talking about? 
A. Well, I am trying to tell you what 
standards that I can speak of from memory 
would not apply to the vehicle that we are 
talking about. 
Q. But I don't understand this last standard 
you are talking about. What was that per-
taining to? 
MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I object on the 
basis of relevancy. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: The standard I was talking 
about was the 208 Occupant Protection 
Standard, probably wasn't in effect in the 
form it is today, and it doesn't apply, to my 
knowledge, to utility vehicles, is all I am 
saying. 
Q. (By Mr. Jensen) The 208, what does that 
refer to? 
MR. JOHNSON: Objection. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. JOHNSON: May we approach the bench? 
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THE COURT: All right. Just a minute. Hold 
your answer. And counsel, approach the 
benchf please. 
(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was 
held between counsel and the Court at the 
bench.) 
THE COURT: The objection to the last 
question is sustained, you may proceed. 
The court was informed at the bench conference that Standard 
208 related to seat belts and was obviously pursuaded that the 
intent of appellants1 counsel in this regard was in direct contra-
vention of the previous ruling of the court and in contravention of 
the court's admonition to the lawyers in advance of the hearing, 
"Therefore there will no no more evidence in this case with regard 
to seat belts. I want everybody to leave it alone and we'll go 
from there." (R. 3807-3808) Notwithstanding this very clear 
admonition, appellants attempted to open the door to that very 
subject from which he was prohibited. 
In summary, the appellants' contention under this point is withoui 
merit and the references made to the record are in substance specious. 
The inference against the trial court is unprofessional and inaccur-
ate. Every citation made by the appellants supports the proposition 
that the trial court bent over backwards to give appellants' counsel 
every opportunity to expound his theory of the case, even to the ex-
tent of allowing him to extend the boundaries established as the 
law of the case. 
C. Appellants' Contention That The Trial Court Erred In 
Excluding Certain Of AMC/Jeep's Evidence. 
The respondent takes some small umbrage against the bald 
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assertions made by appellants to the effect that the trial court 
was incompetent or corrupt, e.g. the following language from 
appellants1 brief: 
The first two points in this brief illustrate 
the unfair advantage accorded plaintiffs by 
the trial court in permitting them to intro-
duce irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evi-
dence and then blocking AMC/Jeep's cross-
examination with respect to that evidence. 
Compounding those errors and removing any 
vestage of fundamental fairness from the 
proceedings, however, the trial court then 
systematically barred the introduction by 
AMC/Jeep of virtually all of its demon-
strative evidence offered to rebut the un-
founded implications raised by plaintiffs1 
experts. Appellants' Brief p. 42. 
That paragraph is an unwarranted attack on the integrity of 
the trial court. 
Suffice it to say that Parts A and B have been adequately 
addressed and frailties of the respondent's arguments revealed. In 
Point III appellants take issue of the court's refusal to allow the 
Heitzman film. In doing so the appellants again fail to point out 
the court's pre-trial rulings relating to plaintiff's Motion in 
Limine. Those combination motions comprised some thirty pages and 
in effect pointed out the interrogatories propounded to the defen-
dants and the specious and evasive answers made by the defendants• 
Those motions also pointed out that three Motions to Compel had 
been made prior to the Motion in Limine and notwithstanding the 
fact that the court had ordered the defendants to answer all of the 
questions therein specified in the motion, defendants had failed 
and refused to do so. (See R. 1063 through 1093.) To the question 
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of the admissibility of films, most of which was covered by 
Heitzman's testimony, Judge Sorensen had previously specifically 
barred the admissibility of such testimony by reason of the failure 
of the appellants to respond to the interrogatories. These matters 
are addressed clearly in Point I above and have been set forth as 
the basis for the courtfs rulings. 
Were not Heitzman's film objectionable for other reasons, it 
was properly barred by the court for the reasons specified in Point 
I above, to-wit: that the plaintiff was never advised that Heitzman 
as the defendants1 expert, nor of the tests that he had made for 
Jeep which it deemed apropos to the instant case. 
The colloquy concerning the offering of that film commences on 
Record page 3336 wherein Mr. Mandelbaum, co-counsel for the 
appellants AMC/Jeep, has called Mr. Heitzman and proposes to in-
troduce the film with that witness. The court excused the jury and 
the interchange between court and counsel takes place over some 
twenty pages of transcript. (R. 3339 through 3358) The substance 
of the objection made by the respondent and cross-claimants was 
that the film was not relevant to the questions involved in this 
case. It was not designed to demonstrate the handling characteristic* 
of the 1972 Commando. In substance, it was a test made by Mr. 
Heitzman, presumably at the instance of Jeep, concerning the 
handling characteristics and qualities of numerous other vehicles 
whose handling characteristics AMC/Jeep contended was worse than 
the Commando. Presumably Mr. Heitzman was going to say that other 
vehicles were worse and he had some movie portrayals of vehicles 
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manufactured by other companies that failed to perform adequately 
to certain tests to which they were subjected by Mr. Heitzman. The 
film was totally objectionable for that reason alone, since the 
question of manufacturing or design defects in other vehicles was 
not at issue. Even if one conceded, arguendo, that all of the 
vehicles portrayed in Mr. Heitzmanfs film were defective, that 
would not relieve AMC/Jeep from liability to the plaintiff in this 
case. The question before the jury and the court was whether the 
Jeep Commando which was the subject of this litigation was de-
fective and whether such defect rendered it unreasonably dangerous. 
In the October, 1983 hearing before Judge Sorensen regarding 
the plaintiff's Motion to Compel, the following exchange took place 
involving questions propounded about tests of the vehicle conducted 
by AMC/Jeep: 
MR. JENSEN: I think that is what they try 
to say, "due to the fact that records relating 
to this subject would be quite old it is 
possible that some records relating to this 
subject had been destroyed." 
THE COURT: That is an equivocal answer. 
MR. JENSEN: Let's try again, let's try 
again, I agree. 
THE COURT: Don't equivocate. It's either 
a yes or no. 
MR. HOWARD: Is the court ordering him to 
answer the question? 
THE COURT: You have either got to answer them 
or you haven't got them. You should be able 
to take care of 17 in thirty days. 
MR. JENSEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay, I will give you thirty days 
to respond to Interrogatory 17. Are we making 
any progress? 
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AMC/Jeep never answered Questions 17 or 18. In the pre-trial 
motion to Judge Bullock (R. 1084) plaintiffs moved the court that 
defendants be precluded from introducing any evidence regarding 
testing on the Jeep Commando and further be restricted from in-
troducing any testimony or evidence with respect to the handling 
qualities and characteristics of the Jeep and the applicable safety 
standards and criteria used by Jeep in the design of the Commando. 
When the matter of the test came up Mr. Mandelbaum said they 
didn't answer the questions concerning the tests conducted by Mr. 
Heitzman because they were not made at the instance of AMC/Jeep but 
rather at the request of the law firm of Joslin and Treat, who had 
the work done at the request of the general counsel of American 
Motors Corporation. (R. 3341) After that evasive reply and after 
additional colloquy the court said: 
What was the reason for not letting them know 
that you had it prior to this time and furnish 
them a copy or permitting them to see it? 
Mr. Mandelbaum: There hasn't been any discovery 
that we haven't seen any of the things their 
experts have, (sic) We haven't shown them 
anything our experts have. It wasn't requested 
until interrogatories, your Honor. 
It appears that because AMC/Jeep did not submit even one 
interrogatory to the plaintiff and, therefore, did not get 
corresponding answers that fact is somehow an excuse for not 
answering the interrogatories of the plaintiff and complying 
with the court's order. That type of reasoning is irrational. 
The plaintiff pointed out that while the plaintiff had sub-
mitted to the defendants AMC/Jeep three sets of interrogatories, 
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two had been evasively answered, which had been the subject of 
three Motions to Compel, and one whole set of interrogatories were, 
at the time of trial, still unanswered, (R. 3343) At the time 
that Judge Sorensen ruled on this subject in October of 1983 and at 
a time when everyone knew the gravity of the questions being asked 
of AMC/Jeep, there could be no question regarding the importance of 
these tests and the results that were obtained. At the time of the 
original argument which was set forth in the plaintiffs1 Motion in 
Limine, it was reiterated. (R. 1081 through 1084, R. 3344) Earlier, 
in October, 1983, counsel for the plaintiffs asked Judge Sorensen 
concerning the questions which he had ordered them to answer, 
including this one, "Judge, what happens if they don't provide it?" 
(The answers to the question.) Judge Sorensen said, "I'll sustain 
the objection to the introduction of it." (R. 3341) The matter 
was further complicated because Interrogatory 18 went to the same 
issue. Interrogatory 18 said, "State whether Jeep Corporation or 
Kaiser Jeep Corporation ever tested or evaluated the directional 
stability or handling chacteristics of the Jeep Commando automobile 
for the model year 66 to 73 under impact conditions." The response 
of Jeep was, "Defendant is uncertain as to what type of testing 
plaintiff is requesting." In arguing that point to Judge Sorensen, 
the court said, "That is a weasling answer, Mr. Jensen." However, 
the plaintiffs never got a better answer from AMC/Jeep despite the 
court's ruling that better answers be provided. In light of the 
extensive argument made, both to Judge Sorensen at the time of the 
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various Motions To Compel Answers and the Motion in Limine made 
prior to the commencement of trial and in light of the more than 
twenty page argument made to the court at the time the Heitzman 
film was markedf the court was certainly within its right to make 
the ruling it did in regard to the admissibility of the said film. 
The court stated: 
The Court: (R. 3353) I'm ready to rule and 
I think in the context of all the circum-
stances and with respect to discovery pro-
. cedures which have heretofore been taken in 
this case, I think the plaintiffs were en-
titled to have or to see the films and test 
results before the trial pursuant to the 
discovery interrogatories and in accordance 
with the rules of civil procedure and con-
sistent with the prior rulings of this court 
and another division of this court, the films 
are not admissible. 
Mr. Mandelbaum: Your Honor, does that apply 
to both films? 
The Court: That applies to the one with the 
CJ-5. Now the other one rests on a different 
principle, I think, and the question that I 
have there is, the relevancy of it. 
(R. 3353). 
In the second film the question of relevancy concerned the 
numerous portrayals of vehicles other than AMC/Jeep vehicles. The 
court found that film to be irrelevant and certainly immaterial. 
The court's ruling provoked additional argument by appellants' 
counsel, to which the court generously and patiently listened. 
Reading of the transcript shows Job-like patience on the part of 
the court under strident protestations of the appellants1 counsel. 
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At the conclusion of additional argument, which comprises almost 
six pages of transcript, the court said, "Well, I think that my 
ruling applies to both films. Okay, we'll call the jury back and 
get on with the trial." (R. 3358) 
The films offered by Heitzman were simply inadmissible because 
of appellants' violation of the orders of the court. In addition, 
the court determined that the films were not relevant. The persuasive 
effect of the film cannot be demonstrated or argued without its 
admission in evidence. 
Matters not admitted in evidence before the 
trier of fact will not be considered on 
appeal before the Supreme Court. 
Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 
1983); In re Estate of Kropf, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978); Corbett v. 
Corbett, 24 Utah 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970). 
The appellants are simply hoisted with their own petard, and 
rightfully so. They should not now be heard to complain about what 
they deem the trial court's "systematically" barring the intro-
duction of the appellants' demonstrative evidence. The mischief of 
the appellants' argument is that it fails to cite those portions of 
the record giving rise to the court's ruling. You would think from 
reading the appellants' brief that the court willy-nilly ruled that 
the plaintiffs' evidence was admissible and AMC/Jeep's evidence was 
not. No contention could be further from the truth. 
The second film which AMC/Jeep contends was erroneously re-
jected was that made by Dr. Charles Warner during the trial. 
Warner's film was rejected for the same reasons applicable to the 
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Heitzman film. The film was first presented on October 31, 1983, 
some thirteen days after the commencement of the trial. After 
viewing the film, in camera, the plaintiffs registered the 
following objections: 
1. The film was within the purview of interrogatories 17 and 
13 and had never been specified to the plaintiffs. Discovery had 
been cut off by rulings of the court. The appellants AMC/Jeep were 
to have furnished all of said material within thirty days of Judge 
Sorensen's ruling in October of 1983 and certainly no later than 
ninety days prior to trial. 
2. The film was not illustrative of any of the issues in the 
case, for it simply portrayed Dr. Warner driving the vehicle in and 
out of a shed, taking it to the scene of the accident with a movie 
camera fixed in place somewhere near the middle of the driver's 
seat, presumably to reflect the scene that would have been visualized 
by the driver. One aspect shows the vehicle on a parking lot 
maneuvering and coming to a stop. On the fourth test he has outrigger 
on, but there is no showing that the maneuvers in the parking lot 
with the outriggers on were in any way illustrative of what had 
taken place on the highway on the day of the accident. There was 
no testimony concerning it. Dr. Warner did not know at what speeds 
the turns were made and one could not tell by looking at the film. 
(R. 3762) The substance of the objection is reiterated again but 
the colloquy between court and counsel regarding the Warner film is 
indicative of the problem confronting the court related to the 
offer of two films through Warner. (R. 3763) The films were 
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Exhibits 174 and 175: 
THE COURT: And when were these films made, 
the 174? 
MR. JENSEN: 174 has been made within the last 
two days. 
MR. JOHNSON: Saturday? 
MR. HOWARD: Saturday. 
MR. HANNI: October 29, 1983. 
The film (Exhibit 174) made by the appellants with a 1972 
Jeep Commando Exemplar was made on the Saturday thirteen days 
after trial commenced and two days before Warner was offered as a 
witness. After seeing the film, the court ruled that it did not 
have probative value and further said: "I believe the test was not 
timely made and is precluded under the rules that we have hereto-
fore established." (R. 3774) 
The other film (Exhibit 175) was made in 1969, but was of a 
Ford vehicle showing people being thrown about as it was rolled 
off of a ramp* (R. 3765 through 3775) The court viewed the film, 
listened with patient understanding to the arguments of counsel and 
ruled that Exhibit 175 was not relevant, had no probative value and 
was, therefore, inadmissible. (R. 3774) 
It is not sufficient for the appellants to say the court 
allowed the plaintiff's films but did not allow the appellants' 
films. There was a vast difference between the foundations laid by 
the plaintiff for the admissibility of his film and that offered by 
the appellants. It is hardly in good taste to levy the blame for 
the appellants' failure of proof by taking one of the comments of 
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the court out of context and labeling it as "simply inexplicable in 
light of the fact that plaintiff had previously been allowed to 
introduce a film of their own Exemplar Commando." Reading of 
Record 3761 through 3775 demonstrates that the court's ruling was 
nothing but explicable. 
The Supreme Court will not assume from appellants' argument 
that the trial court has abused its discretion in its rulings on 
admitting or rejecting evidence. See Sequoia Mfg. Co. v. Halec Con-
struction Co., supra; Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 561 
F.2d 506; Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974). 
Appellants cite Walker v. Trico Manufacturing Co., Inc., 487 
F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973) cert denied 415 U.S. 978 (1974), for the 
proposition that if the plaintiff offers evidence on a point, the 
defendant has the right to rebut the testimony. Contrary to the 
commentary of appellant, the court in Walker, supra, acknowledged 
that "state of the art" has no relevance to the defense of an action 
founded on strict liability. Walker, supra, at 600. Further Walker 
did not involve a failure of a party to comply with discovery orders 
and did not involve tests conducted during trial. 
Concluding, one cannot answer the assertions of the appellants 
regarding what it deems to be the unfairness of the trial court, 
except to say that arguments should be made on the basis of the 
record not by characterizations impugning the motives of the trial 
judge. The plaintiff respectfully represents that the record 
totally and fully supports the conclusions reached by the trial 
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court on evidentiary matters, including those argued under this 
point of the appellants1 brief. 
POINT III 
ARGUMENTS MADE BY COUNSEL OPPOSED TO AMC/JEEP 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
AMC/Jeep contends that statements by counsel at closing argu-
ment constitute reversible error. The plaintiff does not quarrel 
with the fact that counsel should, at all times, conduct themselves 
consistent with standards of professional conduct, however, one has 
to take the argument of counsel for the defendants in light of all 
of the facts that were presented to the court and to the jury. 
Giving regard to the information available to opposing counsel 
before this trial commenced, none of them had any knowledge of 
tests or evidentiary data developed by Jeep that would in any way 
explain Jeep's theory of defense. Because the evidence proffered 
by Jeep during the course of the trial regarding tests and the 
results of tests was inadmissible, primarily because of the nefar-
ious strategy and tactics of AMC/Jeep regarding their own antici-
pated evidence, appellants1 counsel had a right to address the jury on 
the basis of the state of the record, not on the basis of what 
AMC/Jeep thought the record ought to be or on the basis of what the 
record might have been had AMC/Jeep complied with the rules. This 
Court has said that matters not admitted in evidence before the trier 
of fact will not be considered on appeal before this Court. Pilcher 
v. State Dept. of Social Security, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983). 
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Appellants label Mr. Hanni's argument as misconduct. The answers 
of the appellants to the interrogatories submitted by the plain-
tiff are absolutely consistent with Mr. Hanni's argument and he had 
a total right to make that argument. It was not his duty to point 
out the inconsistency between the appellants1 responses to the in-
terrogatories and their later claims of tests made during the course 
of trial or closely thereto. 
The mischief of AMC/Jeep's argument is its attempt by its 
own methods, i.e. its failure to comply with discovery orders, to 
control the scope of the plaintiff's argument. By making proffers 
of inadmissible evidence, AMC/Jeep deems itself authorized to 
control the plaintiff's argument related to the weight of the 
evidence. In fact, it is clearly appropriate for counsel to 
argue the weight of the evidence based upon the state of the re-
cord. The best evidence offered by AMC/Jeep is found in that 
introduced by them at trial and in the assertions set forth in their 
answers to interrogatories that no such evidence was available. 
Counsel was not compelled to rely upon appellant's assertions that 
it possessed persuasive evidence; instead, counsel argued and the 
jury reached its verdict relying upon the evidence presented at 
trial. It was entirely appropriate for counsel to present argument 
related to the weight of the evidence. 
The most that AMC/Jeep can say about Mr. Hanni's argument is 
that it was vigorous. Even so, the court's instruction to the 
jury that arguments are not evidence and that they should rely 
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upon the testimony of the witnesses and the evidence received 
rather than upon the arguments of counsel, does all that is 
necessary to put the argument of Mr. Hanni into proper context. 
That admonition of the court is further amplified by Instruc-
tion Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 15. In addition, the court, at the outset 
of the trial before the opening statements, advised the jury that 
statements of counsel were not evidence in the case and not to be 
considered as such. At the beginning of the plaintiff's opening 
statement, counsel for the plaintiff stated (R. 1768): 
As the court instructed you yesterday, the 
statements of counsel are not evidence in the 
case and they are not to be deemed by you as 
such. The lawyers are allowed to make an 
opening statement to aid and assist the jury 
in understanding the case. 
That statement, augmented by the instructions themselves, clearly 
told the jury that the statements of counsel were nothing more than 
argument. 
Furthermore, AMC/Jeep is precluded from now claiming reversible 
error as a result of counsel's closing argument by way of its failure 
to timely object to the alleged prejudicial statements. It is 
fundamental that a party who objects to argument must allow the court 
an opportunity to cure the defect before the jury deliberates. 
The court in Grammer v. Kohlhaas Tank and Equipment Co., 93 
N.M. 685, 604 P.2d 823 (N.M. App. 1979), held that alleged error, 
with respect to plaintiff's attorney's remark during closing argu-
ment, was not preserved for review where defendant did not object 
to such remark or request the judge to caution the jury. 
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Defendant did not object to the above portion 
of oral argument nor was the judge requested 
to caution the jury. . . • The objection 
to alleged improper argument must be speci-
fied and made known to the court so that 
the court may intelligently rule thereon. 
When that is not done, the proposition is 
not properly reviewable on appeal. In any 
event, the trial court has wide discretion 
in controlling argument of lawyers in addres-
sing the jury and absent a clear abuse of 
discretion, it is not for us to interfere. 
Grammer, 604 P.2d at 831; Unified School District No. 490 v. 
Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 629 P.2d 196 (Kan. App. 1981); 
Ingrum v. Tuscon Yellow Cab Co., 131 Ariz. 523, 642 P.2d 868 (Ariz. 
App. 1981); Joly v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 502 P.2d 362 (Wyo. 1972). 
In Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 554 P.2d 1041 
(1976), the court held that the defendant had failed to preserve 
his claim of error in regard to statements made by plaintiff's 
counsel during closing argument where, although defendant objected 
to such statements, the defendant failed to request a corrective 
instruction. 
The Utah Supreme Court has so held. In Hill v. Cloward, 14 
Utah 2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962), the court held that a party must 
promptly object and move for a mistrial or ask for cautionary in-
structions where something occurs which that party deems prejudicial. 
The court further held that where the complaining party fails to 
so object, he waives whatever rights may have existed to do so. 
[C]ounsel let the incident pass without 
objection and without a request to rectify 
any harm he thought had been done. Fair 
play and good conscience required that he do 
so at the earliest opportunity. It would 
be manifestly unjust to permit a party to sit 
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silently by, believing that prejudicial 
error had been committed/ proceed with the 
trial to its completion, and allow the jury 
to deliberate and reach a verdict, to see 
if he wins, then if he loses, come forward 
with a claim that such an error rendered 
the verdict a nullity. . . . The court 
will not countenance any such mockery of its 
proceedings. If something occurs which the 
party thinks is wrong and so prejudicial 
to him that he thereafter cannot have a fair 
trial, he must make his objection promptly 
and seek redress by moving for a mistrial, 
or by having cautionary instructions given, 
if that is deemed adequate, of be held to 
waive whatever rights may have existed to 
do so. 
Counsel for AMC/Jeep failed to timely object to any statements 
made during closing arguments; therefore, AMC/Jeep is now precluded 
from raising such an objection. Notwithstanding, closing argument 
of counsel was entirely appropriate in that counsel based its closing 
argument entirely upon the stated record. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE RELATED 
TO SEAT BELTS WAS PROPER AND WELL WITHIN THE 
COURT'S DISCRETION. 
The State of Utah has taken neither a legislative nor judi-
cial stand on the issue of the use of seat belts. There exists no 
controlling or even helpful case law within this jurisdiction re-
garding the issue of admissibility of evidence related to the use 
of seat belts; therefore, trial courts in Utah are compelled to 
consider rulings issued by other courts in various jurisdictions. 
The law on the admissibility of seat belt evidence has been 
in a state of flux. The policy implications of the various rules 
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have been roundly debated, with a resulting patchwork-quilt of 
state law on the issue. In some states such evidence is wholly 
inadmissibile, on the theory that automobile manufacturers must 
design a vehicle that is safe for those who, foreseeablyf will 
not wear seat belts. In other states, the seat belt defense is 
admissible under either a contributory negligence or mitigation 
of damages rationale. 
A. The Trial Court Ruled That Before Failure To Use A Seat 
Belt Could Be Used As A Defense, It Would Have To Be 
Shown That Plaintiff Knew Of The Availability Of Seat 
Belts And Made A Conscious Decision Not To Use One. 
In the instant case, counsel for plaintiff submitted a Motion 
in Limine regarding the admissibility of seat belt evidence. (R. 
1274-1294). Defendant AMC/Jeep submitted memoranda in opposition 
to plaintiff's Motion in Limine. (R. 1425-1464). On October 18, 
1983, at the beginning of trial, the trial court ruled on plain-
tiff's Motion in Limine, granting the Motion in part: no refer-
ence to seat belts was to be made on behalf of any party during the 
opening statements. The judge further ruled, however, that if 
after the plaintiff's case any party wanted to introduce the sub-
ject of seat belts, they could made a proffer of proof at that 
time out of the presence of the jury. Judge Bullock advised all 
counsel that when such a proffer was made, he would rule as to 
the relevancy. (R. 4959). 
On October 24, 1983, counsel for plaintiff made a proffer to 
the court that expert witnesses on behalf of plaintiff would 
testify that even had the plaintiff Stephen Whitehead been utiliz-
ing seat belts, such use would not have prevented the injuries 
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sustained and probably would have aggravated the injury. (R. 4893). 
Judge Bullock gave defendant AMC/Jeep the opportunity at that time 
to make its proffer of proof regarding seat belt evidence. Defendant 
AMC/Jeep declined to make such a proffer at that time. (R. 4894). 
On October 31, 1983, AMC/Jeep made proffer that if its witness 
were so asked, he would respond that, "Had he been using the seat 
belt in all probability he would not have received the spinal injury 
that he did receive." (R. 3806). Counsel for plaintiff Whitehead 
notified the Court of the total failure to show that plaintiff 
Whitehead, a passenger in a borrowed vehicle, even had notice of 
the existence of seat belts in that vehicle, a 1971 Commando. 
The trial court, based upon the voluminous memoranda submitted 
by counsel and multiple opportunities for oral argument, ruled 
as follows: 
Ifve read the memoranda and some of the 
cases with regard to seat belts, and my 
conclusions are that there must be some 
showing that Mr. Whitehead knew of the 
seat belts and made a conscious decision 
not to use them. 
Second, there must be a duty to use the 
seat belts, either statutorily or circum-
stantial; that is, as far as circumstances 
are concerned, an awareness that under the 
circumstances danger is likely to occur in 
the vehicle which could be minimized by 
the use of seat belts, some special cir-
cumstances. 
And three, under the facts as I see them 
in this courtroom from the testimony of 
the witnesses, it — the question as to 
whether or not the injury would have occurred 
in this rollover, precisely the way that — 
well, as the witnesses, some of them testi-
fied that it did, or that the use of seat 
belts would have made any substantial 
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difference, is a matter too speculative 
for this jury to determine or to consider. 
Itfs a highly speculative thing, especially 
in view of the buffetting about, the ques-
tion as to when the injury occurred, and the 
fact that there isn't any question but that 
the accident occurred and the injury to the 
vehicle occurred. 
And to speculate what the seat belt might 
have done in this type of a situation is 
just something that the jury ought not to, 
and they will not have under my ruling, 
the obligation to consider. 
Therefore, there will be no more evidence 
in this case with regard to seat belts. I 
want everybody to leave it alone, and we'll 
go from there. 
(R. 3807-3808). 
The seat belts in the Commando vehicle were under the seat and 
as proffered by plaintiff's counsel, the plaintiff had no knowledge 
that the vehicle was equipped with seat belts and accordingly, 
could not have made a conscious decision not to use the restraints. 
It must be remembered that the vehicle was a 1972 model and it may 
well be expected by a reasonable person, that a vehicle of that age 
would not have seat belts. The court invited the defendants to 
proffer contrary evidence; however, at no time was evidence proffered 
by the defendants that the seat belts were visible or reasonably 
accessible to the occupants therein. 
As set forth hereinafter, the trial court's exercise of 
discretion to exclude seat belt evidence was based upon similar 
rulings within similar factual situations throughout a multitude 
of jurisdictions. 
-56-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. There Must Be Imposed Upon A Plaintiff A Duty Before 
Negligence Can Be Found And There Exists No Statutory 
Nor Common Law Duty To Utilize A Seat Belt. 
AMC/Jeep contends that plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt 
was a breach of duty to use the degree of care a reasonable person 
would have observed for his own safety. In support, appellants 
cite a Utah case decided under a totally dissimilar factual setting, 
a railroad crossing incident unrelated to the seat belt issue. 
Courts in most jurisdictions have held that a plaintiff has 
no duty whatsoever to utilize seat belts. The overwhelming 
majority of states have determined that it is an automobile's 
occupant who has the prerogative whether or not to utilize a seat 
belt. 
We do not adopt, at this time . . . that 
an occupant of an automobile either knows or 
should know of the additional safety factor 
produced by the use of seat belts. 
* * * 
. . . [T]he issue of the social utility of 
the use of seat belts is definitely not clarified 
in the mind of the public and the courts. Doubts 
remain as to whether seat belts cause injury, 
and the real usefulness of the seat belt in 
preventing injuries has not become public 
knowledge. 
* * * 
The social utility of wearing a seat belt 
must be established in the mind of the 
public before failure to use a seat belt 
can be held to be negligence. Otherwise 
the court would be imposing a standard of 
conduct rather than implying a standard 
accepted by society. [Citations omitted]. 
Pritts v. Walter Lowery Trucking Co., 400 F. Supp. 897 (W. D. Penn. 
1975). 
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In Hampton v. State Highway Commission, 498 P.2d 236 (Kan. 
1972), the court considered the defendant's argument that in fail-
ing to utilize his seat belt, the plaintiff fell below that standard 
required of a reasonable man in protecting his own safety: 
Neither, we believe, was he falling below 
the standard required of the reasonable, 
prudent man. We have nothing before us on 
which we could confidently base the finding 
that the accepted community standard of 
care requires one to buckle up routinely; 
experience dictates to the contrary. 
Although Utah has passed legislation related to the design, 
installation and specifications of seat belts in vehicles operated 
within the state, no statute exists which requires occupants to 
utilize seat belts. Many courts have construed statutes as 
Utah's which set standards for belts, without an accompanying 
statute requiring the use of seat belts, as implicitly and inten-
tionally rejecting the passage of a statute requiring the use of 
seat belts. In Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W. 2d 293 (W.D. Penn. 
1975), the court held that a statute which required an automobile 
to be equipped with seat belts imposed no duty to wear such belts. 
Absent a statutory requirement, there is no duty. 
In Britton v. Doehring, 242 So.2d 666 (Ala. 1970), the court 
In the absence of a statutory requirement 
admission of evidence of non-use of available 
seat belts can only be justified by resort 
to common law principles under our established 
rules of evidence. That is, by our taking 
notice of studies demonstrating that seat 
belts are effective protective devices in 
our requiring their use. In view of the con-
troversy which still surrounds the effec-
tiveness of seat belts, particularly in Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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those situations in which injuries may even 
be attributable to wearing such seat belts, 
we are unwilling now to accept such studies 
as of decisive probative value. [Emphasis 
in original]. 
In Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 610 P.2d 668 (Mont. 
1980), the court was faced with issues identical to issues herein. 
There was no statutory requirement that an automobile occupant 
wear a seat belt nor was there any case law on the subject. 
There, the plaintiff contended that the overwhelming majority of 
jurisdictions were in accord that there is no common law duty to 
wear a seat belt, and absent a statute requiring the wearing of a 
seat belt, negligence could not be predicated upon a failure to 
do so. Defendant therein contended that the use of seat belts to 
mitigate the injury was a proper question. The court then deter-
mined that: 
The overwhelming majority of the cases, 
be they from contributory negligence states 
or comparative negligence states, refuse 
to penalize a plaintiff for not using seat 
belts and have rejected the defense. 
Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977); Barry 
v. Coca Cola, 99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273; Birdsong v. ITT 
Continental Banking Co., 160 Ind. App. 411, 312 N.E. 2d 104 (1974); 
Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 242 So.2d 666 (1970); Brown v. 
Case, 31 Conn. Supp. 207, 327 A.2d 267 (1974); Brown v. Kendrick, 
192 So.2d 49 (Fla. App. 1966); Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 
215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967); D. W. Boutwell Butane Co. v. Smith, 244 
So. 2d 11 (Miss. 1971); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 
555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976); King Son Wong v. Carnation Co., 509 S.W. 
2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Lawrence v. Westchester Fire Insur-
ance Co., 213 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 1968); Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 
A.2d 914 (Del. Super. 1967); McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720 (D.C. 
App. 1976); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W. 2d 293 (Mo. App. 1970); 
Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E. 2d 65 (1968); F i_sc_her j/^ _ 
Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973); Nash v. Kamath, 21 Ariz. 
App. 530, 521 P.2d 161 (1974); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 
52 Mich. App. 619, 217 N.W. 2d 900 (1974); Robinson v. Lewis, 254 
Or. 52, 457 P.2d 483 (1969); Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 
88 N.M. 579, 544 P.2d 719 (1975); Stallcup v. Taylor, 62 Tenn. 
App. 407, 463 S.W. 2d 416 (1970). 
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The court in Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 
48 (Okla. 1976), expressly rejected the defendant's assertion of 
a common law duty to use seat belts: 
There is no common law or statutory duty 
requiring the use of seat belts. . . . 
Recent technological advances are not usually 
inducted into doctrines of law, until such 
time as they have been sufficiently tried, 
proven and accepted for the purpose they 
were intended. Historically, the seat belt 
phenomenon is in its infancy. It is in a 
state of influx. 
It is clear that there exists no statutory nor common law duty 
within the State of Utah to utilize seat belts when occupying a 
motor vehicle. Where no duty exists, a fortiori, no negligence 
exists, and thus, imposed upon the plaintiff Stephen Whitehead was 
neither a duty nor corresponding negligence. 
C. The Imposition Of A Duty To Use Seat Belts Lies With 
The Legislature. 
Courts refusing to impose a duty upon motorists to utilize 
seat belts have routinely held that the responsibility of creating 
such a duty lies with the legislature. 
The United States District Court in Pennsylvania, in attempt-
ing to.apply the law of the forum state, held: 
We believe that the Pennsylvania courts 
would follow the majority position and not 
permit a defendant to assert a seat belt 
defense. Until the legislature requires 
drivers and passengers to use safety belts, 
there is really no basis for such a defense. 
Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.R.D. 132 (E.D. Penn. 1976). In 
Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So.2d 49 (Fla. App. 1966), the court 
noted: 
-60-
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It may be that after further research by 
various safety committees, the law may be 
changed to require the use of seat belts 
and to affix some element of negligence for 
failure to use same. This is not the law 
today and it is not within the province 
of this court to legislate on the subject, 
regardless of what might be the thinking 
of the individual members of the court. 
The Congress of the United States has con-
sidered several bills pertaining to motor 
vehicle and highway safety but in neither 
bill as approved, has there been a mandatory 
use of seat belts. [Emphasis added]. 
The court in Britton v. Doehring, supray stated the need 
for a fixed standard: 
An occupant of a car involved in normal, 
everyday driving should either be required 
to wear a seat belt or he should not. That 
determination should be left to the dis-
tinguished members of our State Legislature. 
Most recently, in Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 
1511 (6th Cir. 1983), the court stated: 
[T]he seat belt defense is complicated fur-
ther by the peculiarly legislative nature 
of the issue. The penalties to be attached 
to seat belt non-use are uniquely amenable 
to resolution by the state legislature. 
Indeed a number of other state courts have 
left to their legislatures the determination 
of the evidentiary effect of a^plaintiff' s 
failure to wear a seat belt. 
2 
E.g., Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 610 P.2d 668, 
683 (Mont. 1980) ("In light of the history and the numerous legis-
lative problems that must be considered to effectively extend the 
seat belt rule of law we . . . reach the - conclusion that to adopt 
a seat belt defense when the legislature has failed to do so would 
be ill-advised.") See also State v. Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444, 448 
(Ind. 1981); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 
62 (Okla. 1976); Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 396, 517 P.2d 
458, 460 (1973); Britton v. Doehrinq, 286 Ala. 498, 508, 242 So. 
2d 666, 675 (1970); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W. 2d 293, 301 (Mo. 
App. 1970); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 238, 160 S.E. 2d 65, 
73 (1968). 
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Furthemoref the Utah legislature recently enacted a child re-
straint law. It may be argued that the legislature has considered 
the subject and has limited its legislation to car restraints for 
children. That legislation has set the limit that the legislature 
has been willing to extend the law. It would be an abuse of author-
ity for this Court to impose its will upon the legislature and extend 
the parameters beyond which the legislature has thus far been unwil-
ling to go. 
D. The Duty To Mitigate Damages Cannot Arise Before The 
Plaintiff Is Damaged. 
The appellants are barred from raising mitigation of damages 
as a defense. Mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense 
which must be pleaded or it is waived. Rule 8(c) and Pratt v. 
Board of Education, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977); Martin v. Porak, 638 
P.2d 853 (Colo. 1981). There is no such plea. 
Jeep Corporation failed to raise mitigation of damages as an 
affirmative defense in its original answer filed on October 31, 
1980. On September 12, 1983, Jeep filed a motion to amend its answer 
to include several new defenses, including mitigation of damages. 
On October 7, 1983, the motion was denied as not timely made. (R. 
1366). AMC did not file an answer for more than three years. (R. 
84-87). On September 17, 1983, (R. 993-995) it filed its answer 
attempting to raise several new defenses. The court did not rule 
on the proposed affirmative defenses. (R. 1366). 
Assuming, arguendo, that such a defense had been properly raised 
this theory has been relied upon by defendants and routinely 
rejected by courts throughout various jurisdictions. 
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In Derheim v. Fiorito Co., 492 P.2d 1030 (Wash. 1972), the 
trial court ruled, on plaintifffs motion in limine, that during 
trial defendant was prohibited from making any reference to plain-
tiff's failure to wear a seat belt. Those pretrial rulings were 
assigned as errors. Specifically, the defendant asserted that 
plaintiff's failure should have been admitted in mitigation of 
damages or in proof of an avoidable consequence. By way of offer 
of proof, defendant offered testimony that plaintiff's injury 
would not have been sustained if his seat belt had been properly 
fastened. After reviewing the diversity of court holdings, the 
court in Derheim held: 
We believe the cases in those jurisdictions 
rejecting the "seat belt defense" are the 
better reasoned cases. It seems extremely 
unfair to mitigate the damages of one who 
sustains those damages in an accident for 
which he was in no way responsible, parti-
cularly when, as in this jurisdiction, 
there is no statutory duty to wear seat 
belts. 
In Taplin v. Clark, 626 P.2d 1198 (Kan* App. 1981), defendant 
sought to introduce seat belt evidence on comparative negligence 
and mitigation of damages theories. The trial court sustained 
plaintiff's motion in limine which had the effect of precluding 
defendant from introducing evidence of plaintiff's failure to use 
the available seat belt. Citing Hampton v. State Highway Commission, 
supra, the court reiterated: 
While as a general rule one must use reason-
able diligence to mitigate one's damages 
once the risk is known [citation omitted] 
one is not required to anticipate negligence 
and guard against damages which might ensue 
if such negligence should occur [citation . 
omitted]. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In short, there was no duty to use a seat 
belt, either under the common law standard 
of care or to mitigate damages. 
After "[a] review of the civil war on this recent innovation 
in tort law," the court in Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 
544 P.2d 719 (N.M. 1975) held: 
Due care in the use or non-use of a seat 
belt is pre-accident conduct and does not 
fall within the doctrine of "avoidable 
consequences". As a result, evidence of 
non-use of seat belt is irrelevant on the 
minimization of damages. [Citations omitted]. 
Most recently, in Lafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co., 425 So. 
2d 1147 (Fla. App. 1983), the court illustrated the practical 
difficulties inherent in the mitigation of damages theory as applied 
to the use of seat belts: 
Mitigation of damages concerns a plaintiff's 
conduct after an accident, not before. 
Were we to admit evidence of non-use of seat 
belts, we may well be obligated to admit 
evidence of other pre-accident conduct deal-
ing with safety issues. For example, 
numerous studies have shown that standard-
size cars are safer than compact or sub-
compact cars. Should a plaintiff be penalized 
for not taking this safety factor into 
consideration when purchasing a car? Fur-
ther, hardtops are safer than convertible 
tops. Is this for jury consideration and 
for a court to instruct on? . . . 
We view such evidence of prior conduct as 
a Pandora's box which we decline to open. 
Furthermore, the prior regulation of conduct 
is a matter for the legislature rather than 
the courts to decide. [EMphasis added]. 
In its efforts to persuade the court that the failure to 
use a seat belt constitutes a failure to mitigate damages, AMC/Jeep 
cited the Utah case of Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 
_ £ A _ 
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1301 (Utah 1981) as holding that the jury should "consider the 
faults of both plaintiff and defendant when they 'have united as 
concurrent proximate causes of an injury' in strict liabaility 
cases." (Brief of Appellants, p. 62). Respondent respectfully 
submits that appellants are blatantly incorrect in their applica-
tion of the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Mulherin. 
Appellants argue that even in the context of strict liability, 
the relative fault of the plaintiff and the defendant should be 
compared; however, in quoting the language of Mulherin, AMC/Jeep 
fails to point out that such a comparison of fault is strictly 
limited to any misuse of the product by the plaintiff or unreason-
able use of the product with knowledge of the defect and aware-
ness of the danger. Mulherin, supra, at 1302-3. AMC/Jeep 
failed to prove misuse of the vehicle (Stephen Whitehead was a 
mere passenger) or unreasonable use despite knowledge of the ve-
hicle's defects. Misuse of the product and unreasonable use of the 
product with knowledge of its defects are defenses which are wholly 
inapplicable in the context of the use of seat belts. Addressing 
this very issue, the court in Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 
concluded that: 
A seat belt defense is essentially a 
claim of contributory negligence, since 
the defendant is claiming that the injured 
person's failure to use the seat belt was 
unreasonable. Because contributory negli-
gence is not a defense to an action based 
on strict liability in tort, the seat belt 
evidence is irrelevant and should be excluded. 
Respondent submits that even in a comparative negligence con-
text, the duty to mitigate damages cannot arise before the plain-
tiff is damaged: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
If the allegations of negligence are true, 
appellee did nothing to cause the accident. 
Should he be required to anticipate the 
negligence of the appellants? We think 
not. One's duty to mitigate damages cannot 
arise before he is damaged. The failure to 
minimize must occur after the injury. At 
most the failure of the appellee to use the 
seat belt merely furnished a condition by 
which the injury was possible. It did not 
contribute to or cause the accident. It 
is well established in our court that if 
the negligence merely furnishes a condition 
by which the injury was possible, and a 
subsequent act caused the injury, the exis-
tence of such a condition is not the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. 
Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., supra. 
E. A Tort Feasor Must Accept The Plaintiff As He Finds Him. 
Several courts have denied defendants the opportunity to intro-
duce seat belt evidence based upon the rationale that the tort 
feasor must accept the plaintiff as he finds him, whatever the 
degree of vulnerability. So found the Colorado Supreme Court in 
Fischer v. Moore, 517 P.2d 458, 459 (Colo. 1973): 
We conclude, as the court of appeals, that 
the failure of the driver or passenger of 
a motor vehicle to use a seat belt . . . 
may not be pled as a bar to recovery of 
damages in an action against a tort feasor 
whose negligence provides the initiating 
force and is a proximate cause of an injury 
to a driver or passenger. [Citations omitted] 
If we were to hold otherwise, the person 
who was driving a Volkswagen, and not a 
Mack truck, could be said to be more vulner-
able to injury and, therefore, guilty of 
contributing to his own injury as a matter 
of law. Such a result would be contrary 
to the entire "fault" philosophy which is 
found throughout the law of tort. Under 
the common law principles of tort law, it 
is axiomatic that the tort feasor must 
accept the plaintiff as he finds him and 
may not seek to reduce the amount of damages 
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by spotlighting the physical frailties of 
the injured party at the time the tortious 
force was applied to him. [Citations omitted] 
Along similar lines of reasoning, the common 
law dictates that the tort feasor may not 
rely upon the injured party's failure to 
utilize a voluntary protective device to 
escape all or a portion of the damages which 
the plaintiff incurred as a consequence 
of the defendant's negligence. [Citations 
omitted] 
The court in Lafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co.f supra, simply 
stated: 
However trite it may bef we still hold to 
the basic concept that a tort feasor takes 
his plaintiff as he finds him. 
F. Testimony Related To Seat Belt Use Is Merely Conjectural 
And Speculative. 
The lack of statutory guidance, diversity of opinion found 
within case law, and the variety of conclusions drawn by experts 
with respect to the actual benefits of seat belt use have all worked 
together to compel the denial of admissibility of seat belt evi-
dence on the basis that such evidence would be merely conjectural 
and speculative. 
So, in this state of quandry, the plaintiff 
and defendant could each have argued on the 
merits of the use of seat belts, but each 
argument would necessarily have been con-
jectural and of doubtful propriety. We 
therefore dispose of the appellant's first 
point argued on appeal by holding that the 
trial court was not in error in refusing 
to allow the defendant to offer to the jury 
evidence of the plaintiff's failure to use 
the seat belt as constituting a defense to 
gross negligence on the part of the driver. 
Brown v. Kendrick, supra, at 51. Courts precluding seat belt evi-
dence could easily foresee the "battle of experts" each presenting 
the relative merits and disadvantages of seat belts. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A further problem bothers the courts, and 
that is the effect of injecting the seat 
belt issue into the trial of automobile 
personal injury cases. The courts are con-
cerned about unduly lengthening trials and 
if each automobile accident trial is to pro-
vide an arena for a battle of safety experts, 
as well as medical experts, time and expense 
of litigation might well be increased. 
Derheim v. Ford Motor Co., supra, at 1035. In addition, the experts 
could not only routinely present general evidence related to seat 
belt use, but would also attempt to speculate on the nature of the 
injuries sustained in each accident. 
[A]llowing the seat belt defense will lead 
to a veritable battle of experts as to what 
injuries would have or have not been avoided 
had the plaintiff been wearing a belt. At 
best it would cause substantial speculation 
by the trier of facts. 
Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977). 
[T]he seat belt defense inevitably raises 
problems of conjecture. Not only must the 
jury determine what actually happened, it 
also must determine what would have happened 
if the seat belt had been used. 
Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., supra, at 139. Furthermore, the circle 
of speculation would be enlarged to encompass the area of apportion-
ment of damages. 
The seat belt defense would soon become a 
fortuitous windfall to tort-feasors and 
would tend to cause rampant speculation as 
to the reduction (or increase) in the amount 
of recoverable damages attributable to the 
failure to use available seat belts. 
Fischer v. Moore, supra, at 460; see also Lafferty v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., at 1150. 
The relative merits of the use of seat belts and their causal 
relationship to any plaintiff's actual injuries is simply too specu-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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G. The Seat Belt Defense Is Inappropriate In The Context 
Of Strict Liability. 
Appellants1 contentions based upon an alleged common law dutyf 
mitigation of damages and comparative negligence are simply inap-
propriate in the context of strict liability. 
Under Utah law, strict liability can be defended on only two 
bases: 1) misuse of the product by the user or consumer, and 
2) unreasonable use of the product despite knowledge of the defect 
and awareness of the danger. Mulherin, supra. 
The Supreme Court of South Dakota, in denying recognition of 
the victim's negligence as a defense in strict product liability, 
stated as follows: 
Strict liability is an abandonment of the 
fault concept in product liability cases. 
No longer are damages to be borne by one 
who is culpable; rather they are borne by 
one who markets the defective product. . . . 
We believe it is inconsistent to hold that 
the user's negligence is material when 
the seller's is not. . . . We hold that 
the plaintiff's or the defendant's negligence 
is irrelevant . . . 
Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W. 2d 155 (S. Dak. 1977). 
The Utah State Supreme Court's holding in Mulherin, supra, is 
in accord with this case as well as others which have refused to 
merge negligence principles with strict product liability. 
There is absolutely no evidence which could lead to the con-
clusion that Stephen Whitehead misused the Jeep Commando; nor 
under any circumstances of the facts, can it be shown that he had 
knowledge of the Jeep's defective or unsafe condition and subse-
quently made an unreasonable use of the vehicle. To assert the 
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seat belt defense under the auspices of the comparative negligence 
laws of the State of Utah is not appropriate in the factual cir-
cumstances of this case. 
More specifically, the court in Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 
supra, noted the inapplicability of the seat belt defense in a 
strict liability context. 
In our case, although the plaintiff sued 
the manufacturer of the vehicle on claims 
of negligence as well as strict liability, 
the jury's verdict against the defendant on 
liability was based on strict liability. 
« . . . Evidence of non-use of a seat belt 
should be excluded, since it is akin to 
a claim of contributory negligence, which 
is not a defense in a strict liability case. 
Similarly, in the instant case, the jury's conclusion, that de-
fendant AMC/Jeep was liable for its unreasonably dangerous product, 
was based upon strict liability principle; therefore, the seat belt 
defense is wholly inappropriate. 
H. Point IV Conclusion. 
As recently as January 25, 1984, an appellate court decided 
the issue of the admissibility of seat belt evidence and set forth 
its entire opinion in one paragraph: 
[W]e would clarify our position as to the 
issue of whether refusal to allow evidence 
on the effect of appellee's failure to wear 
his seat belt constituted reversible error. 
We hold that it did not . . . 
Volkswagen of America v. Long, 444 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. App. 1984). 
In holding that evidence related to seat belt use was inad-
missible under the facts and law applicable to this case, the trial 
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court's ruling was in accordance with innumerable courts throughout 
a variety of jurisdictions. 
In sum, other courts so holding have relied upon the follow-
ing rationales: 
1) There is no statutory requirement in 
the forum state that seat belts be used. 
2) There is insufficient justification 
for a court to require the use of seat belts, 
take notice of their effectiveness, and 
impose a common law duty where none exists 
statutorily. 
3) The admission of such evidence of non-
use would permit the jury to "compare 
the negligence" which is wholly inappro-
priate in a strict liability context. 
4) The admission of such evidence creates 
a situation wherein a plaintiff in a 
vehicle with seat belts is penalized as 
compared with a plaintiff in a vehicle not 
so equipped. 
5) Requiring seat belt use results in one 
who is lawfully using the highways having 
to anticipate that another driver may be 
negligent; a plaintiff need not predict the 
negligence of the defendant. 
6) Permitting the jury to compare the 
damages attributable to the negligence of 
a defendant with that attributable to a 
failure to use available seat belts would 
allow the jury to enter into the realm of 
speculation and conjecture. 
7) Adoption of such a requirement may 
conflict with traditional tort doctrines 
such as comparative negligence, avoidable 
consequences and mitigation of damages. 
8) The decision to impose a prior restraint 
on an individual's activity, i.e. to impose 
a duty to utilize seat belts, is best left 
to the legislature. 
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9) Seat belts are not required in all 
vehicles and defendant should not be en-
titled to take advantage of the fortitous 
circumstances that plaintiff was riding 
in a car so equipped. 
10) It is a fact and persuasive that the 
majority of motorists do not habitually 
use their seat belts. ("Belt Use f76," 
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 
1976). 
11) Admissibility of seat belt evidence 
would lead to a battle of experts as to 
the probability of injuries. 
In view of the lack of unanimity on the beneficial effect of 
seat belts, the lack of public acceptance, the considerations 
set forth above, in the absence of any common law or statutory 
duty and in absence of controlling case law, the trial court's 
exercise of discretion to exclude the seat belt issue in no con-
ceiveable manner constituted error. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS' 
ATTEMPT TO RAISE A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
DEFENSE JUST PRIOR TO TRIAL. 
Plaintiff filed and served an Amended Complaint on August 1, 
1980, naming as defendants American Motors Corporation and Jeep 
Corporation. (R. 84-87). The complaint set forth the date of the 
cause of action as October 16, 1979. (R. 84). Paragraphs 13 and 
15 set forth the allegation that the vehicle, a 1972 Jeep, was 
manufactured and sold by defendants in an unreasonably dangerous 
condition. (R. 86). Thus, in August, 1980, defendants had suffi-
cient information to establish any defense based upon the appro-
priate statute of limitations. 
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The applicable statute of limitations defense is set forth 
within Utahfs Product Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1977). 
Utah's Product Liability Act was enacted in May of 1977 and 
applicable to those causes of action arising two years after its 
promulgation, i.e. May, 1979. Based on the allegations in plain-
tiff's complaint of August, 1980, defendants could readily ascer-
tain that the ten-year statute of limitations from the date of 
manufacture was not applicable; however, the barring, of the action 
based upon the six-year from the date of initial purchase limita-
tion was a possibility. If the vehicle in question were sold prior 
to October 16, 1973, defendants could perhaps have pursued the 
statute of limitations defense. 
Nevertheless, defendant Jeep Corporation submitted its answer 
on October 31, 1980, affirmatively alleging contributory negligence, 
assumption of risk, alteration and misuse but failed to raise the 
defense of statute of limitations. (R. 113-114). Defendant Ameri-
can Motors Corporation failed to answer plaintiff's complaint for 
three years. On September 12, 1983, one month before trial, four 
years from the initial cause of action and three years after the 
complaint was filed against it, defendant American Motor Corpora-
tion submitted an answer which set forth the applicable statute 
of limitations defense. (R. 993-996). Simultaneously, defendant 
Jeep Corporation submitted a Motion For Leave to Amend Answer and 
add the statute of limitations defense. (R. 983-989). In response, 
plaintiff and the other defendants submitted Memoranda in Opposi-
tion To Defendant's Motion To Amend setting forth points and 
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authorities relative to attempts to amend at such late date and 
the corresponding prejudice to the plaintiff and other defendants 
and waste of judicial efficiency. (R. 1004-1013). 
On October 18, 1983, at the beginning of trial, the trial 
court ruled as follows: 
1. The motion of the defendant, Jeep 
Corporation, to amend their [sic] answer to allege 
the defense of the Utah Products Liability 
Act is denied on the basis that the motion 
was not timely made, the amendment of the 
answer would cause an undue burden upon 
the plaintiffs and other defendants and 
would result in the continuance of the 
trial date which the Court feels is unjusti-
fied under the facts and circumstances. 
(R. 1271-1272). 
The trial court did not, however, totally preclude defendants 
opportunity to prove the applicability of the statute of limita-
tions, but instead, ruled as follows: 
2. The Court, however, will allow 
the defendant, Jeep, to proffer such proof 
at the time of trial as Jeep deems necessary 
to preserve its record. The Court reserves 
its ruling as to whether or not the defen-
dant American Motors Corporation may raise 
the issue [of] the Utah Products Liability 
Act and the attendant statute of limita-
tions. (R. 1272). 
Respondent Whitehead submits to this Court that defendants ma 
absolutely no proffer of proof related to the Product Liability 
Act or statute of limitations during the entire course of trial; 
therefore, the issue is waived. 
Appellants AMC/Jeep made no mention whatsoever, nor offered 
an iota of evidence, which would substantiate the applicability of 
the product liability statute of limitations. The pertinent por-
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tion of the Act limits action based upon the date of manufacture, 
or upon the date of initial purchase. At this point in time, all 
parties to the lawsuit and the court below are yet without knowledge 
concerning "the date of initial purchase for use or consumption," 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3(1) (1977). The record is absolutely 
void of evidence on this issue. (R. 4774-4775). 
In Westley v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 
1983), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the principle that where 
an amended pleading would delay trial and the substance of the 
amended allegation had been known a full year earlier, the trial 
court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend. 
Although Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure tends to favor the granting 
of leave to amend, the matter remains in 
the sound discretion of the court. On 
the facts presented, we are not convinced 
that the trial court abused its discretion 
in refusing to grant the requested leave 
to amend. An amendment would certainly 
have delayed the trial and the substance of 
plaintiff's new allegation was known a full 
year earlier when plaintiff discussed it 
in his deposition. 
Westley, 663 P.2d at 94.
 m. 
The defense of statute of limitations must be set forth affirm-
atively at the earliest possible stage of litigation. Rule 8(c), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. As set forth above, the instant 
action had been before the Court nearly four years before defen-
dants raised the product liability statute of limitations. That 
defense was available to the defendant at the early stages of liti-
gation. 
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The product liability statute of limitations defense was 
passed by the Utah Legislature in 1977 and effective prior to the 
service of pleadings upon defendants AMC/Jeep. The defense sought 
to be added to the defendants1 Amended Answer was available to it 
at the outset of the case and the facts giving rise to such defense 
were all set forth on the face of plaintiffs1 complaint. The 
attempt to raise the statute of limitations defense so late in liti-
gation was absolutely without excuse and not in accord with the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure nor governing case law. 
Although Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
a party to amend pleadings, it is only by consent of the court in 
its discretion. The court below carefully considered the attempt 
by defendants AMC/Jeep to add the statute of limitations as a de-
fense and determined that such an amended answer, at that stage of 
the proceedings was not timely made. 
The determination made by the court below was based upon the 
burden which would be placed upon all parties to the lawsuit were 
a new defense allowed to be raised immediately prior to trial after 
four years of discovery. At that time, the plaintiff had incurred 
in excess of $50,000.00 in out-of-pocket expenses directed at 
preparation of the case against AMC/Jeep and the defendants 
Anderson and VALIC who had filed crossclaims against AMC/Jeep, had 
incurred large expenses in preparation of their contentions against 
AMC/Jeep. The trial was extremely complex, with numerous experts, 
witnesses and parties whose schedules and preparations would have 
had to be adjusted, rearranged or repeated. The length of the 
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trial, nearly three weeks, the attendant difficulties of reschedul-
ing on the court calendar, and costs of changing the trial date 
would have been exhorbitant and wasteful. 
While statutes of limitation are a means of judicial expedi-
ency, they too are subject to an application that is fair and just. 
Such statutes ought not to be utilized to propitiate delay, waste of 
judicial resources or visit catastrophic economic and time losses 
on the parties who have relied on the defendant's waiver of a de-
fense that had been available for years during the pendency of the 
action. Furthermore, such a defense should be raised when first 
available and not because of timing for tactical or strategic 
reasons. 
There can be little question that to allow the amendment of 
the answer just prior to trial would require and mandate extensive 
discovery on behalf of the plaintiff. All of the manufacturer's 
documents relating to the date of manufacture would be required to-
gether with the documents relating to distribution of the vehicle 
to an automobile dealer. The evidence established that George 
Mullner, the owner of the vehicle, who was Deborah Whitehead's 
father, was not the original owner of the vehicle. (R. 2105). 
Documentary evidence relating to original purchase of the vehicle 
would be imperative to a decision of a fact finder. In that regard, 
plaintiff had the right to conduct depositions of witnesses estab-
lishing date of initial sale. The postponement of such a costly 
and complex trial after three years of preparation simply cannot 
be justified in light of defendant's total failure to even proffer 
-77-
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to the court that it had any evidence that the statute of limita-
tion had expired when the action was commenced. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently addressed this very issue. 
In Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 
(Utah 1983), the defendant attempted to amend its answer, immedi-
ately prior to trial, to assert for the first time the statute of 
limitations. The trial court took the motion under advisement and 
at the close of evidence, the court denied the motion to amend. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
As a general proposition, we will not re-
verse a trial court's denial of a motion to 
amend, made at the commencement of or dur-
ing trial, to assert the statute of limita-
tions. 
Staker, 664 P.2d at 1190. See also Goeltz v. Continental Bank & 
Trust Co., 5 Utah 2d 204, 209 P.2d 832 (1956); Farmers & Merchants 
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Pulliam, 481 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1973); 
Nevels v. Ford Motor Co., 439 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1971). 
In the Staker opinion, the Utah Supreme Court noted that: 
The statute of limitations defense must 
be pleaded as an affirmative defense in a 
responsive pleading, or it is waived, Utah 
..••••• R.Civ.P. 8(c) and 12(h), unless an amended 
pleading asserting the defense is allowed 
pursuant to the requirements of Rule 15(a).
 :. 
[Citations omitted]. A trial court's re-
fusal to grant leave to amend is not re-
versible error unless the denial constitutes 
an abuse of discretion. E.g. Girard v. 
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983); [Cita-
tion omitted]. 
In Staker, the court was not willing to reverse the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to amend its answer to add the 
statute of limitations defense. The court noted that, the plaintiff 
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had gone to the expense of discovery and preparation for trial in 
reliance on defendant's answer filed over two years prior to trial. 
As set forth above, plaintiff herein had prepared for trial for 
nearly four years in reliance on defendants' answer. The court in 
Staker also noted that: 
The essential facts upon which the statute 
could have been asserted were known to the 
defendant from the beginning. Defendant 
alleges no surprise, discovery of new evi-
dence relating to the defense, or other 
justification for its delay in asserting 
the statute of limitations. 
Staker, 664 P.2d at 1190. The facts upon which the Utah Supreme 
Court upheld the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
amend are identical to and perhaps even less persuasive than the 
facts upon which the trial court in the instant case based its 
decision. In Staker, defendants requested leniency based upon 
substitution of counsel two days before trial; no such possible 
excuse existed in the instant case. And while plaintiff relied 
on defendant's answer for two years in Staker, plaintiff herein 
relied and engaged in extensive trial preparation for four years 
in which this defendant actively participated. 
Clearly, in reliance upon its recent ruling rendered in Staker, 
the Court must uphold the decision of the trial court in denying 
defendants' motion to amend and subsequent denial of a directed 
verdict based upon the statute of limitation defense which defen-
dants failed to timely raise. (R. 4774-4775). Furthermore, the 
defendants absolutely failed to bring in any evidence, when express-
ly given the opportunity by the trial judge, to establish the dates 
of initial purchase of the vehicle in question. Therefore, the 
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trial court was without evidence upon which a statute of limitations 
defense may have been predicated, 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff submits that this case was carefully and thoroughly 
tried by experienced counsel to an experienced and erudite Court. 
All issues of law were thoroughly briefed and argued under circum-
stances giving the Court ample opportunity for considered judgment. 
The evidentiary rulings were made with deliberate care. The atmos-
phere in the courtroom was calm and decorus and all counsel, liti-
gants , witnesses and jury were treated with respect and courtesy. 
The trial was conducted by court and counsel to the highest standards 
of judicial procedure. All litigants have been afforded their day 
in court in accordance with the finest judicial tradition. The ver-
dict of the jury and the rulings of the trial court should be affirmec 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON HOU#R 
/HOWARD, L£WIS 
J£*S***^ ^ y j&L 
& V^ D, f o r 
& PETERSEN 
^r 
CHARD B y < r O H N S O N , f or"!—~ 
HOWARD, LfEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
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HOWARD. LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 EAST 3O0 NORTH STREET 
P. O. BOX 7 7 8 
PROVO. UTAH 8 4 6 0 1 
TELEPHONE: 3 7 3 - 6 3 4 5 
Attorneys for. Plaintiffs ^ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and 
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE 
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, and AMERICAN 
MOTOR SALES CORPORATION 
JEEP CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 53,04-6 
COME NOW the plaintiffs and move the Court to prohibit the de-
fendants American Motor Sales Corporation and Jeep Corporation from j 
i 
introducing any evidence pertaining to certain interrogatories here--
i 
tofore propounded tc the defendants in which the defendants have j 
failed and purposely refused to answer in defiance of the Court's j 
i 
rulings and in contemptiour disregard of the rights of the liti- ! 
j 
gants and the Court, In support of this motion, the plaintiffs 
allege: 
1. On May 5, 1981, the plaintiffs submitted certain Interroga-[ 
tories to be answered by the defendant American Motors. The 
defendant AMC filed a spurious response on July 13, 1981, the 
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substance of wnich was tr.at tney refused to answer Interroaatcries j 
i 
4 t n r o u J r. ^  o , s n c t n e answers t.';at were g 1 v e n were specious a n c j 
purposely deceptive. As a result of those irresponsible answers, j 
the plaintiffs fiiec a action to compel answers on July 6, 1981. | 
That mot ion was never rulec upon by the Court. , j 
2. Almost a year after the plaintiffs1 motion to compel j 
1 
answers and responses, the defendant AMC filed, belatedly on | 
I 
August 16, 1982, additional specious answers to the Interrogatories,! 
none of which addressed the questions and all of which were j 
patently frivolous and deceptive. The plaintiffs, through a j 
series of three subsequent motions to compel, eventually obtained j 
a hearing before the Honoraole Allen B. Sorensen on October 29, 
1982, wherein he heard part of the plaintiffs1 motion and continued 
the oalance of the plaintiffs' arguments and motion to December 
7, 1982. The latter of which hearing was never held. j 
It is the plaintiffs1 position and the plaintiffs are en-
titled to a ruling from this Court that the defendants cannot in-
troduce any evidence pertaining to questions 4 through 58 of the 
May 5, 1981, interrogatories which the defendants have failed to 
answer. 
3. Plaintiffs further will object to any defenses to the 
claims of the plaintiffs based upon an evaluation of the length 
of the wheel base of the Jeep Commando automobile or its resistance 
to rollover, based upon the defendants1 refusal to answer questions 
21 and 22. The defendants have repeatedly refused to answer ques-
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tions concerning handling characteristics ana qualities of its Jeez 
Commando automooiie on tne basis that giving sucn a response or 
answer was oppressive and overly burdensome. The defendants should 
net now be allowed to offer any sucn information in defense of 
the plaintiffs1 contention. 
4. The plaintiffs, on September 15, 1981, subsequently 
submitted a First Set of Interrogatories to Jeep Corporation and 
an identical set of Interrogatories to American Motors which 
constituted the second set of Interrogatories to American Motors. 
In response to those Interrogatories, Jeep Corporation answered 
the same on August 16, 1982. The answers of Jeep Corporation on 
that date were totally specious. 
Specifically, the plaintiffs believe that defendants cannot 
introduce any evidence at this time pertaining to question 16 of 
plaintiffs1 September 15, 1981, interrogatories regarding design, 
planning and manufacture of the Jeep Commando automobile for rea-
son that defendant AMC contends that it has no plans or blue 
prints by which it can identify this Jeep. The plaintiffs are 
further entitled to an order barring any testimony or evidence 
which the defendants in response to questions 17, 18, 19 and 20 
contend is not available or unknown to them. 
At the hearing referred to above on October 29, 1982, Judge 
Sorensen heard part of the questions and made an order concerninc 
part of the responses. The following sets forth questions asked 
by plaintiffs, answers given by defendants, the Court's order 
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ecuirini cefencants tc answer the questions, anc supplemental 
; ; : i v. «r 1 .-
7 QUESTION NO. 2: With regard to ail Jeep Commando vehicles 
5 manufactured oy Jeep Corporation for model years 1966-72, please 
9 furnish the number of all owner reports or consumer complaints 
•10 from all sources either received by Jeep Ccrooration or of which 
11 Jeep Corporation is aware alleging injury or fatality as a result 
12 of the malfunction or lack of (1) a safety roll bar; (2) non-rigid 
§5 c| 13 cab enclosures, including both non-rigid roofs and doors; or 
?• = 5 * e 
UJ * r» on 
en 2 is w z I * r J; 14. (3) general instability causing roll-overs. Include all reports 
o
 0 a H .. 
o«o •§ 15 ; or complaints, whether or not they have been verified by Jeep Cor-
z >- o 5 <;^S& 
»5 £p 16 i poration. 
z2 
£ 17 ; ANSWER: This interrogatory is overly broad anc burdensome 
< 
13: and the settlement information may be privileged^ It is not limited 
19 to the particular model year nor to defects necessarily at issue 
20 alleged in this case. Moreover, the information requested is not 
21 indexed by us in a manner to make the information available in the 
22 form requested. However, if plaintiffs believe that there has been 
23
 a case relevant to the instant matter and can identify further by 
24^ owner name, date, and vehicle identification number, defendant 
25 will attempt to search for a record. 
26 ORDER OF THE COURT: "All right. I will make an order. I 
will give you ninety days to get it. If it's not done — that is 
ninety days — if it's not done in that time, I will sustain ob-
27 
28 
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jecriors to any evidence from your client on tne issue raised thai j 
-r.a: evidence touches upon. How's that?" * * * (Pace 3 of Iran- j 
script) * * * "I will have you give them all available informs- j 
ticm or reasonably retrievable information as regards the model 1?~X, 
oniv. Now that is all I can do, Mr. Howard." (Pace 1U of the Iran-; 
I 
script) | 
In response to quesiton 2, the defendant filed a supplemental j 
answer to interrogatories on January 3, 1983. To the same question,! 
the defendant then answered: ! 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER NO. 2: Defendant objects to this inter- j 
rogatory on the grounds that it is overbroad, unduly burdensome, I 
and seeks information that is neither relevant nor reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. • j 
Without waiver of these objections, defendant will make avail-
able a list compiled from existing records of consumer communica- { 
tions received as of October 16, 1979, alleging injury as a result j 
of an accident in which a 1972 Commando vehicle overturned. J 
i 
MOTION: The plaintiffs move the Court to deny the defendants I 
i 
any richt to introduce any evidence pertaining to Interrogatory i 
I 
No. 2 and specifically evidence regarding the safety of or lack of » 
safety of the Commando automobile as affected by (1) roll bars, 
I 
(2) roofs and doors and (3) general instability causing rollovers I 
on the basis they have failed and refused to answer the Interroga- ! 
tory repeatedly and have purposely defied the order of this 
Court. 
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QUESTION NO. 3: Witr. respec: to eacn owner report or con-
sumer eemr lamt rtricir-, :c : n answer :;• the previous interrogate:^ 
please identify the contents of each and every document in accord-
ance with the definitions prececino tnese interrogatories. 
ANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory No. 2. 
ORDER OF THE COURT: "I will have you answer interrogatory 
number three to the same extent and the same limitations as I have 
made on interrogatory number two, Mr. Howard." (Page 10 of the 
Transcript) 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER NO. 3: See response to Interrogatory 2. 
MOTION: The plaintiffs contend that the defendant's response 
to this interrogatory is totally specious and contemptious. The 
defendant should be denied any right to respond to any issue raised 
by Interrogatory No. 3. 
QUESTION NO. 4: Specify what investigations Jeep Corporation 
undertook in regard to each of the accidents, injuries and/or 
fatalities, identified in answer to interrogatory no. 2. 
ANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory No. 2. 
ORDER OF THE COURT: "Why can't I make the same order on 
interrogatory number four with the limitation I have placed on your 
required answer to interrogatory number two? 
MR. JENSEN: That is fine." 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER NO. 4: See response to Interrogatory 2. 
Defendant further objects to this interrogatory to the extent it 
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seeks information protected from disclosure as work product and zy 
the attorney-client privilege. 
MOTION: The plaintiffs contend that the defendant's response 
to this motion and the Court's oraer is contemptious and the defen-
dant should De denied any right to put on any testimony concern-
ing investigations it has made regarding accidents, injuries or 
fatalities. 
QUESTION NO. 5: Specify with particularity the results of Jee 
Corporation's investigation into the accidents, injuries and/or 
fatalities identified in answer to interrogatory No. 2. 
ANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory No. 2. 
ORDER OF THE COURT: "I will make the same order with the same 
restrictions I have made on interrogatory number two. We are 
making some progress here. I don't know whether we are making 
error or not." (Page 11 of the Transcript). 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER NO. 4: See response to Interrogatory 2. 
Defendant further oojects to this interrogatory to the extent it 
seeks information protected from disclosure as work product and 
by the attorney-client privilege. 
MOTION: Plaintiffs move the Court to deny the defendants any 
right to introduce evidence pertaining to the results of Jeep's 
investigation into accidents, injuries or fatalities related to 
their Commando automobile. 
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QUESTION NO. 6: IcenLiiy all lawsuits, D:ir. pencirrj and 
Corporation is or was a defendant against allegations of malfuncti 
or failure of tne types iis:eu in interrogatory no. 4, involving 
Jeep Commando vehicles for the mocei years 1^ 6 6 — 7 3 • 
ANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory No. 2. 
ORDER OF THE COURT: "My order will stand. Now the same 
thing on number six. I will require you to answer number six with 
the same restrictions I have placed on your answer to number two. 
I nave taken care of all of them, navenft I?" (Pace 11 of the 
Transcript) 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER NO. 6: Defendant objects to this inter-
rogatory on the grounds that it is overly broad, unduly burdensome 
and seeks information that is neither relevant nor reasonably cal-
culated to lead to tne discovery of relevant evidence.' 
Without waiver of these ooiections, defendant states that 
based on a review of records systematically maintained there were 
no lawsuits served as of October 16, 19^9 in which it was alleged 
that a 1972 Commando overturned. 
MOTION: The plaintiffs move the Court to deny the defendant 
any right to identify any litigation to which the defendant was a 
party or to introduce any evidence resulting from any investiga-
tions or developments contained therein, on the basis that the 
defendant has purposely and contemptiously refused to answer the 
ouestions of the plaintiffs. 
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QUESTION NO. 7: Identify all claims, Doth pending and close: 
by nam- and address of the claimant in wnicn Jeep Corporation was 
requested to pay damages because of allegations of malfunction or 
failure of the types indicated in interrogatory No. 2. 
ANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory No. 2. 
ORDER OF THE COURT: "Seven is the same." (Pace 11 of the 
Transcript) 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER NO. 7: Defendant objects to this inter-
rogatory on the grounds that it is overly broad, unduly burden-
some and seeks information that is neither relevant nor reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. 
Without waiver of these objections, defendant states that 
based on a review of records systematically maintained there were 
no claims made as of October 16, 1979 in which it was alleged that 
a 1972 Commando overturned. 
MOTION: Plaintiffs move the Court to prohibit the defendant 
from introducing any evidence pertaining to the question raised in 
interrogatory no. 7. 
QUESTION NO. 8: State what amount, if any, Jeep Corporation 
paid on each of the claims identified in the previous interroga-
tory. 
ANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory No. 2. 
ORDER OF THE COURT: "Eight is the same." (Page 11 of the 
Transcript) 
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SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER NO. 8: Defendant furtner oriects to tr. : = 
:r.:e:rog5iory on tne grounds that it seeks information mat is p r . 
tected from disclosure by public policy. 
MOTION: Plaintiffs move the Court tc prohibit the aefendant 
from introducing any evidence pertaining to the question raised :n 
interrogatory no. 8. 
QUESTION NO. 9: State the name and address of all persons or 
groups of persons at Jeep Corporation and Kaiser Jeep Corporation 
who participated in the design, manufacture and sale of the Jeep 
Commando automobile for the model years 1966-73. 
ANSWER: This defendant will state that many of the thousands 
of components that went into the Jeep Commando were changed during 
the years 1970-73 and that it has no record of who would do the en 
Some changes were done by vendors to Jeep Corporation, and neither 
Jeep Corporation nor American Motors has access to such records. 
All changes were done by or with the approval of Jeep Product 
Engineering. 
ORDER OF THE COURT: "I don't know. But give him the infor-
mation, Mr, Jensen, limited the same as I have limited on inter-
rogatory number two. He is not going to be able to use it on a 
trial, but it might be relevant in a question of settlement." 
(Page 12 of the Transcript) 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER NO. 9: Defendant objects to interroga-
tory on the grounds that it is overly broad, unduly burdensome 
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and seeks information that is neitner relevant nor reasonably cal-
culated to ieac to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without 
waiver of these objections, defendant states the Director of En-
gineering during 1970 and the early part of 1971 while the 197 2 
model year Jeep Commando was oeing developed was F. A. Stewart. 
The Plant Manager of the Jeep Toledo plant during the 1972 model 
year was Werner Jean. American Motor Sales Corporation had respor 
sidility for sales for the 1972 model year. 
MOTION: Plaintiffs move the Court to prohibit the defendant 
from introducing any evidence pertaining to the question raised ir-
interrogatory no. 9. 
QUESTION NO. 10: Identify the plans, engineering drawings, 
blue prints and specifications in their completed or final form 
that were utilized in the production and assembly stages for the 
following components of the Jeep Commando automobile for the mode: 
years 1966-73: 
a. The roof enclosure; 
b. The wheel base and drive-train; 
c. The track width of both front and rear axles; 
d. Any roll bar or other protective device designed to 
prevent roof collapse; 
e. Steering mechanism; 
f. Stabilizer bars; 
g. Suspension systems; 
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h. Brakes. 
ANSWER: Jeep Corporation is not m a pcsiticn at tms late 
date to define all changes which may have taken place. Defendant 
objects to this interrogatory as overly broad and unduly ourcen-
scme. There is no way with the thousands of chances in such a broad 
request, we could be certain we had them all, particularly in 
light of the fact that the interrogatory encompasses material 
that would never necessarily have been in the hands of this defen-
dant and would be over 15 years old. However, without waiving our 
objection, we provide the attachec list. If plaintiffs desire 
additional information and can be specific about their request, 
we will attempt to provide additional information. (See attached 
lists). 
ORDER OF THE COURT: After 10 or 15 pages of argument, the 
exchange is as follows: 
MR. JOHNSON: With regard to this interrogatory, if Mr. 
Jensen will put in some sort of supplemental answer what Jeep 
Corporation contends to be the drawing that pertains to.the Command' 
involved in this accident that is responsive to that interrogatory, 
that is all we want. 
THE COURT: Can you limit your answer to that, Mr. 
Jensen? 
MR. JENSEN: I don't know. I assume all the information 
does pertain to this. In view of Jeep's problem that they tell me 
in finding somebody who was there who participated in tne design-
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MR. JOHNSON: Right. That is all we ask. 
THE COURT: Just a minute. I am talking to Mr. Jensen. 
MR. JOHNSON: Excuse me, Judge. 
THE COURT: Are you still trying to take this all down, 
Mr. Roundy? 
THE REPORTER: I am trying to. 
THE COURT: What did you have to say, Mr. Jensen? 
MR. JENSEN: I think what has happened, I have sent these 
interrogatories back to these folks. They tell me they tried to 
find somebody who was around now who knew what was going on in the 
design of a vehicle ten, twelve, thirteen years ago, and what they 
have done, as I understand it, is go to various areas, pull out 
everything they could find and they have shipped it to me, and 
they believe that all, or most, of this pertains to the design of 
this '72 vehicle. The change orders, the specifications and so 
forth. I suppose I dare not go any further than that. I think 
the thing that will really help them, help me, help everybody, is 
we tell you the best people we know, either in or out of the com-
pany, who were involved at that time, give them all this paperwork, 
and they can ask them. Now was that involved and utilized in this 
1
 72 Jeep? 
THE COURT: How long will it take you to give them those 
names and addresses? 
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MR. JENSnN: I nope within tnirty cays, tne maximur.. 
SUPTLLCENTAL A!\w»\E:- .v^. . IU: Dei encant objects tc n^  is in-
terrogatory as overly broad and unduly burdensome. There were 
tnousands of changes curing tne period referred to. Many corr::•:•-
nents were purchased iron, suppliers anc defendant may net nave ha: 
all engineering drawings anc specifications. Further records are 
incomplete. Without waiving these objections, a list will be pro-
vided. If plaintiffs desire additional information and can be 
specific about their request, defendant will attempt to provide 
additional information. 
MOTION; Plaintiffs move that the Court bar the defendant Jeep 
Corporation and AMC from offering any plans, blue prints, drawings 
or specifications related to the 1972 Jeep Commando automobile in-
volved in this litigation. 
QUESTION NO. 11: With regard to the documents referred to in 
the previous interrogatory, identify in accordance with the defini-
tions preceding these interrogatories the names and adcresses of 
the person, persons or group of persons who authored, prepared, 
supervised and approved the documents. 
ANSWER: All documents were done under the supervision of or 
by the Jeep Product Engineering Department. 
ORDER OF THE COURT: 
M.R. HOWARD: In regard to number eleven it's my under-
standing -- or number ten that he will give us — he said he hopes 
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that can tell us if that is so. 
THE COURT: Is that correct? 
MR. JENSEN: I think that is a fair statement. 
THE COURT: So ordered. Does that take care of eleven 
also? 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER NO. 11: All documents were prepared under j 
- i [ 
the supervision of or by the Jeep Product Engineering Department. j 
MOTION: Plaintiffs move that the Court deny the defendant the 
right to call persons or groups of persons who may have authored, 
prepared, supervised or approved documents pertaining to the design 
and construction of the 1972 Jeep Commando. 
0UESTION.NO. 12: State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser 
Jeep Corporation determined the approximate or exact position of 
the center of gravity for any or all Jeep Commando automobiles for 
the model years 1966-73 inclusive, under different passenger load 
conditions. 
ANSWER: Center of gravity figures for the Commando vehicle 
can no longer be found. 
ORDER OF THE COURT: 
MR. JOHNSON: Nof what he is just saying is he is now 
looking for a way of bringing an expert on the stand who is going 
to testify to the center of gravity, saying well, we computed it 
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arter the answers ic interrogatorles. 
that information ninety days Defore trial. 
MR. JOHNSON: We nee: that now, Judge. 
MP. JENSEN: We don't know it. We thir> we are going f 
have to f inc — 
THE COURT: Mr. Johnson, as I get it you are trying to 
ask me to get Mr. Jensen to go back and prepare --
MR. JOHNSON: No, I can't understand the way this is 
Deing presented. Jeep Corporation has three experts that they ho-
used in thirty cases throughout the United States, and in almost 
every case that has gone to trial the same expert has testified ai 
to the center of gravity figures for the Jeep. Now for Jeep to 
come in in this proceeding and say they don't have it and they 
can't compute it — 
THE COURT: Why don't you depose those experts? 
MR. JOHNSON: Because he won't give us the names of his 
experts. 
MR. HOWARD: If he will tell us — 
MR. JENSEN: I have told them the fellows we have got. 
One is a John Haberstat out of Seattle. He doesn't know — he 
doesn't know where the center of gravity if in this vehicle. He1: 
going to have to find out where it is. You have got your experts 
who have testified a nundred times against Jeep. I suppose you 
are going to tell me they don't know at this point. 
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THE COURT: If the answer stancs I will sustain an ob-
jection to calling t.nat witness. 
MR. HOWARD: All right. 
MR. JENSEN: May I nave this clarification, Your Honor. 
We don't know where the center of gravity is frorr. any source at 
this point on this vehicle. 
THE COURT: I will hold you to this answer. 
MOTION: Defendant Jeep and AMC did not supplement their 
answer at any time and, therefore, the plaintiffs move the Court 
to deny the defendant the right to call Mr. HaDerstat or any 
other expert to testify concerning the center of gravity of the 
Jeep Commando as it may relate to roll over propensity or any 
other driving or steering -characteristic of said Jeep Commando. 
This motion is also applicable to questions 13, 14, 15 and 16 which 
all relate to the center of gravity adn to which the defendants 
have given the same specious and deceptive answer. 
QUESTION NOS. 13, 14 anc 15: 
The defendants have not supplemented the answers to 13, 14 
and 15. The basic repartee concerning these questions is as 
follows, after two pages of debate: 
MR. JOHNSON: I wonder if we asked him for drawings as 
it relates to this Jeep so we could just determine the most 
fundamental thing. Jeep says, "Hey, we don't have any drawings." 
Then two weeks before trial or even at trial they come in with a 
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co~cie"ce schematic on ine Jeep and the plaintiffs are sitting trier-
v ii''. 1 i\ 6 \' TT-.c v> 11". s w ice open* N o w t n e r e are certain c o c ur. e n i s t n a i 
a manufacturer has to keep ana has to make available. Now one of 
those is the center of gravity. If you leave it open so that the 
dav i-efcre trial Havernack (stet) (Haberstat) can come in and 
-
w
* J ' 
•« H^r-o « ere's my center of gravity calculations which I just 
o happened to find in my middle desk drawer — " 
11 THE COURT: I would sustain an objection to it. 
< 
K . 12 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. What we need to know is how much 
< » 
u 
>££ SS 13 time will vou cive them to do that? What criteria? 
, J - 53 ^  © 
!zlwiS 14 THE COURT: At the time of trial. |DZ§5«
0 n Q H •• u
 0 ™ 3 J iQ«6 -I 15 I; MR. JOHNSON: How much time prior to the time of trial 
' z w. . 9 ? i: . < • a. > s 
s ? w £? 1 6 i; must they give us their center of gravity calculations? 
S|a < 
)o 17 THE COURT: Three months. That is if they intend to 
L t 
< 
13 present evidence. "If they don't intend to present evidence on it, 
19 then it's moot. *** 
20 ***THE COURT: I will let that stand. That takes care of 
21 13, 14 and 15. " ;: 
22 MOTION: The plaintiffs are entitled to have a ruling from the 
23 . Court denying the defendants any right to have any expert testify 
2^; concerning the effect of a given center of gravity on the roll 
25 over propensities of the vehicle. 
26;. 
27: QUESTION NOS. 16 and 17: 
28 16. With reference to the design and development of the Jeep 
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Commando automooiie for model years 1966-73, state wnetner Jeep 
Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation nestec for cr otherwise 
determined the handling characteristics and qualities of said 
automobiles both curing the development anc subsequently to the 
initial production of said automobiles. 
17. If the answer to interrogatory No. 16 is in the affirma-
tive, please supply the following additional information: 
a. With respect to the handling qualities and charac-
teristics of said Jeep Commando automobiles, what safety stan-
dards and criteria were utilized by Jeep Corporation or Kaiser 
Jeep Corporation is designing and developing said automobiles; 
b. Whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation 
tested for or evaluated the tendency of said Jeep Commando auto-
mobiles for the model years 1966-73 to either understeer or over-
steer at different operating conditions; 
c. If the answer to b above is in the affirmative, 
state specifically how such tests and evaluations were accom-
plished. 
ANSWER NO. 16: Yes. 
ANSWER NO. 17: See reports of tests being furnished. Due to 
the fact that records relating to this subject would be quite old, 
it is possible that some records relating to this subject have 
been destroyed. 
ORDER OF THE COURT: 
MR. HOWARD: All right. We are now to 16. That answer 
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i .- . ii tn- answer z^ ir.trrr 
meant to be — " 
THE COURT: That says 15. 
MR. HOWARD: It's a mistake. 
meant. 
Triev uncerstooc wnat it 
THE COURT: Does anybody object to my changing that? 
MR. JENSEN: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: By pen? Was that 16? 
MR. HOWARD: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. HOWARD: (Reading) "Please supply the following 
additional information: 
a. With respect to the handling qualities and characteristics 
of said Jeep Commando automooiies, what safety standards and cri-
teria were utilized by Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation 
in designing and developing said automibiles; 
b. Whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation 
tested — " 
THE COURT: I am looking at his answer. He says you have 
got this information. 
MR. HOWARD: They don't tell us what safety standards 
they used. They have safety standards. They design to particular 
standards. I want to know whose standards they used. 
THE COURT: What about that, Mr. Jensen? 
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i 
MR. JENSEN: Tnese fellows are telling me a let aoout j 
! 
wr.at mv veoDie know anc co that I oon't Know, Your Honor. I 
- * - i 
» 
THE COUPT: Can you find out? | 
MR. JENSEN: We have qiven the best information that I ! 
i 
nave been able to elicit from my people. Tne reports of tests, ; 
and there are a bundle of tests, that we say take a look, use them I 
what you want. So as far as testing, and safety standards, the j 
tests we have to say they're safety standard number one and it j 
requires that the Jeep not do this or that, apparently we don't j 
have any such records. I 
MR. HOWARD: We would like to know what criteria, stan- ! 
dards, were designed in advance for this Jeep. 
THE COURT: Does this question ask that? 
MR. HOWARD: Yes, certainly. With respect to handling j 
qualities and characteristics, what safety standards and criteria. 
In other words, is this Jeep supposed to be able to turn in a forty 
foot radius at twenty miles an hour? Is that the standard of de- I 
i 
sign? If it is, tell us that. If it isn't, tell us that. If this j 
Jeep cannot turn in a forty foot radius at twenty miles an hour we j 
need to know that. They have told the engineer, "We want a vehicle 
that can do thus and so." 
THE COURT: Can you produce that information? j 
MR. JENSEN: I doubt it. It goes back to this problem. } 
We can't even find people who were involved in the design, let j 
alone papers that discuss what, ycu know — he says they're criterial 
i Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tnere couic oe or couldn't r»e. I acn' t know. This kind of cornice -1 
THE COURT: Why don't you answer by saying this informa-
tion is no longer available? 
MR. JENSEN: I think that is what: they tried to say. "Due 
to the fact that records relating to this subiect would be quite 
old, it is possible that some records relating to this subject have 
been destroyed." 
THE COURT: That is an equivocal answer. 
MR. JENSEN:" Let's try again. Let's try again. I agree. 
THE COURT: Don't equivocate. It's either a yes or no. 
MR. HOWARD: Is the Court ordering him to answer the 
question? 
THE COURT: You have either got them or haven't got 
them. You should be able to take care of-17 in thirty days. 
MR. JENSEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. I will give you thirty days to 
respond to interrogatory 17. 
Are we making any progress? 
MOTION: Plaintiffs move the Court that the defendant be pre-
cluded from introducing any testing on the Jeep Commando in questio 
and further be restricted from introducing any testimony or evidenc 
with respect to the handling qualities and characteristics of the 
Jeep and the applicable safety standards and criteria used by Jeep 
in the design of the Commando. 
-22-
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QUESTION NO* 18: State wnether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser 
Jeep Corporation ever testec for or ctnerwisc evaluated the cire.-
tional stability or handling characteristics of the Jeep Commancc 
automobile for model years 1966-73 under impact conditions. 
ANSWER: Defendant is uncertain as to what type of testing 
plaintiff is requesting with this interrogatory, Out to the extent 
that it has located testing related to handling characteristics, 
reports of such tests are being furnished. 
ORDER OF THE COURT: 
» * * * j think we ought to have the same answer there. 
Ordered to answer within thirty days." 
MR. JENSEN: May I see what is the answer? 
MR. HOWARD: "Defendant is uncertain as to what type of 
testing plaintiff is requesting." 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. I am trying to read it toe. 
MR. HOWARD: All right. 
MR. JENSEN: I think we have answered that fully. 
THE COURT: He says he's answered it. 
MR. HOWARD: He hasn't located any testing. We don't 
know of any testing related to handling characteristics. What it 
says is, "Reports of such tests are being furnished." Do you have 
reports of such tests? 
MR. JENSEN: That is what we furnished you. It's avail-
able. 
MR. HOWARD: Which one? 
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» 
MR. JENSEN: My letter to you of Octooer 7th, iter tv:: j 
i 
Eigr.ty-six paces of various pro:rc£= reports wnicr. a^ .ar-r:\- _y :. =--.-r j 
been tentatively identified by my client as tests reports pertain- j 
i 
inc to this oasic Commando vehicle. \ 
r 
THE COURT: That is a weaseiino answer, Mr. Jensen. ! 
j 
MR. JENSEN: That is all they have got. j i 
» 
MR. HOWARD: I want to know what test they had for stafcilijt 
t 
or handlina characteristics. I don't think I ought to have to sort | 
I 
through all that. I air, a lawyer. I don't know what the engineer- j 
i 
inc criteria or data are. All they ought to do, Judge, is say, j 
question 18, these are the tests that respond — these are the [ 
answers to that question and here are the documents. Then I will j 
go through them. If they're not, I will know it. 
MR. JENSEN: I will clarify that answer. | 
THE COURT: Will you clarify number 18 further. ' 
MR. HOWARD: Within thirty days? c 
MR. JENSEN: Yes. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER NO. 18: Defendant is uncertain as to what 
type of testing plaintiff is requesting with this interrogatory or 
how it differs from Interrogatory 16, but to the extent that it has 
located testing related to handling characteristics, reports of suet 
tests are being furnished. An explanation of the vehicles in-
volved in those tests is set forth in the response to Interroga-
tory 17. n-. 
-24-
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11 ! covery. 
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QUESTION NO. 19: If the answer to the previous interrogatory 
is in the affirmative, identify all such tests and/or evaluations 
in accordance with the definitions preceding these interrogator-
ies. 
ANSWER: See reports being furnished. Due to the fact that 
records relating to this subject would be quite oldf it is possible 
that some records relating to this subject have been destroyed. 
ORDER OF THE COURT: 
THE COURT: Will you clarify number 18 further? 
MR. HOWARD: Within thirty days? 
MR. JENSEN: Yes. 
MR. HOWARD: All right. 19. 
THE COURT: That covers 19, doesn't it? 
MR. HOWARD: Yes. The same there. 
THE COURT: That takes care of 19 if he responds to my 
order on 18. 
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SO^?L:LN*:LN iAL ANSWtR NO. 19. See tne re;/:r:s oeir.. furnishec 
an ~ tr.-e exu• I5r.a 11en in tne resyi.c-r.str t-.r ^ r ~ r- ri' ; f: * ". r •. _ . ^ 11.z*•_ 
records relating to this suoject are quite old, some records re-
lating tc this subject have been ciscarctc, 
MOTION': Plaintiffs ere entitiec to nave ail sue:, tests cr ::. 
results of such tests oarrec from introduction at trial and for an 
order preventing and Darring the introduction of any testimony or 
evidence related to operational directional stability or handling 
characteristics of the Jeep Commando. 
QUESTION NO. 20. State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser 
Jeep Corporation ever tested for or otherwise evaluated the 
operational directional stability or handling characteristics of 
the Jeep Commando for the model years 1966-73 automobile under 
real cr simulated cross wind conditions. 
ANSWER: To the extent that reports of any tests relatec to 
handling have been located, they are being produced. 
ORDER OF THE COURT: 
MR. JENSEN: The same test. I will clarify the answer. 
THE COURT: You will clarify the answer to number 20? 
MOTION: The defendants did not clarify their answer. Plain-
tiffs are entitled to have all such tests or the results of such 
tests barred from introduction at trial and for an order preventin 
and barring the introduction of any testimony or evidence related 
tc operational directional stability or handling characteristics 
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of the Jeer Commando, me ceiencants snoulc oe c-arrec from 
directional stabilty or handling characteristics of the Jeep 
Conmando for the model vears 1966-^3. 
i 
QUESTION NO. 21. If the answer to the previous interrogatory 
is in the affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in 
accordance with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
ANSWER: See reports of tests being furnished. Due to the fact; 
that records relating to this subject would be quite old, it is 
possible that some records relating to this subject have been de-
stroyed. 
ORDER OF THE COURT: 
THE COURT: Your response to 20 will take care of 21. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER NO. 21: See reports of tests being furnislje 
and the explanation in the response to Interrogatory 17. Due to 
the fact that records relating to this subject would be quite old, 
it is possible that some records relating to this subject have been ! 
destroyed. 
MOTION: Plaintiffs are entitled to have all such tests or the 
results of such tests barred from introduction at trial and for an 
order preventing and barring the introduction of any testimony or 
evidence related to operational directional stability or handling 
characteristics of the Jeep Commando. 
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OUnSiION NC. 22: State wnether Jeei Ccr^cra"ion or Kaiser 
dynamic stability of the Jeep Commando autmobile for model years 
1966-73. 
ANSWER: Defendant is uncertain as tc what ty;> of testmc 
plaintiff is requesting with this interrogatory but to the extern 
that it has located testing related to handling characteristics, 
reports of such tests are being produced. 
ORDER OF THE COURT: 
THE COURT: Weil, their response, additional response, 
on 22 will take care of 23, won't it? 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER NO. 22: Defendant is uncertain asx to what 
type of testing plaintiff is requesting with this interrogatory. 
The term "aerodynamic stability" is not in common use in the auto-
motive industry and has no recognized definition in the context of 
automobile engineering. Wind tunnel tests are conducted for the 
purpose of determining air flow around the vehicle. 
MOTION: The plaintiffs move the Court that the defendants 
be barred from introducing any evidence whatever concerning the 
operational directional stability or handling characteristics of 
the Jeep Commando of the model years 1966-73. 
QUESTION NO. 23: If the answer to the previous interrogatory 
was in the affirmative, please identify such tests and/or evalua-
tions in accordance with the definitions preceding these interroga-
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t c r i e s • 
records relating to this subject would oe quite old, it is pessi 
tnat some records relating to tnis subject have oeer dcitrcyr,:. 
ORDER CF THE COURT: 
THE COURT: Well, their response, additional response, 
on 22 will take care of 23, won't it? 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER NO. 23: See response to Interrogatory 
22. 
MOTION: The plaintiffs move the Court that the defendants 
be barred from introducing any evidence whatever concerning the 
operational directional stability or handling characteristics of 
the Jeep Commando.of the model years 1966-73. 
QUESTION NO. 25: State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser 
Jeep Corporation ever tested for or otherwise evaluated the effe 
of safetv roll bars in Jeep Commando automobiles for model vears 
1966-73 as related to the prevention of physical injuries and/or 
fatalities to the passengers in said automobiles in the event of 
roll-over or other accident. 
ANSWER: No such materials have been located. 
ORDER OF THE COURT: 
MR. HOWARD: I don't want to get to the trial and you 
we have now found out. I want them to say yes or no. They have 
had a year and a half to find the answer to that, Judge. 
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The Court on Octcoer 29th did not have time to consider the 
balance of the questions which were propounded and unanswered by 
Jeep and AMC, however, the defendants Jeep and AMC have never given 
adequate or appropriate answers to any of the questions which were 
the subject of the plaintiffs1 many motions to compel answers and 
the plaintiffs are entitled to have an order of the Court oarrinc 
the defendants from offering any testimony inconsistant with 
their present answers to questions 27-43, or from producing any 
new testimony or new evidence not specifically set out to in the 
answers heretofore given. 
DATED at Prove, Utah, this g day of October, 1983• 
<6£ 
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27 : 
28 : 
/p^^L**^ '/Cc>-4<~*+/f 
CKSON HOWARD, for 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
&RD B. JOHNSON/T'for: RICHARD 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
--00O00--
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and 5 
STEVEN WHITEHEAD, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE j 
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY and AMERICAN MOTOR 
SALES CORPORATION, JEEP 
CORPORATION, 
Defendants. $ 
Civil No. 53,046 
TRANSCRIPT OF 
PROCEEDINGS 
--00O00--
December 29, 1982 
At the Hour of 10:00 a.m. 
UTAH COUNTY BUILDING 
Room #301 
Provo, Utah 
BEFORE: 
THE HONORABLE ALLEN B. SORENSEN, JUDGE. 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiffs 
For the Defendant 
VALIC 
For the Defendant 
Anderson 
For the Defendant: 
Americar Mccors 
Sales Corporation 
RICHARD JOHNSON, ESQ. 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
120 E. 300 N. St. 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84601 
TERRY J. PLANT, ESQ. 
Hanson, Russon & Dunn 
650 Clark-Leaming Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
STUART Ho SCHULTZ, ESQ. 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
THOMAS A. PUFFIN, ESQ. 
311 South State #380 ' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JAY E. JENSENf ESQ. 
900 Reams Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
--00O00--
WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had: 
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! 
accordance with the definitions preceding these inter- J 
t 
i 
rogatories. i 
i 
I don't understand that interrogatory, Mr. Johnson. 
I hope Mr. Jensen does. I don't. 
MRo JOHNSON: It refers to twenty-five. In 
twenty-five -- can we stay seated when we address you so 
we can look over these things? 
THE COURT: Okay, anything to move this 
thing forward. 
MRo JOHNSON: In twenty-five we asked them 
about the tests as it relates to the effect of the safety 
bars, and we asked them, "Did you test?" Now their answer 
was, "No such tests, no such materials have been located." 
Then twenty-six says, "If you answer that previous 
interrogatory in the affirmative indicating that you did 
test for the safety of the roll bar, tell us what tests 
you made." 
THE COURT: All right, what order did I 
make on twenty-five? 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay, twenty-five --
THE COURT: What order did I make on 
twenty-five? 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, I understood that 
Mr0 Jensen's response was "no". 
MR. JENSEN: We stand on our answer. 
9. 
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THE COURT: Then that takes care of twenty-
six, doesn't it? i 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. They never tested for 
the safety of the roll bar. 
THE COURT: Okay, twenty-seven. Twenty-sevei 
has a yes or no answer, doesn!t it? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. 
MR. JOHNSON: It's the same question as it 
relates to, "Did you ever test for the short wheelbase?" 
THE COURT: I am going to make an observatioiji 
as an attorney, Mr. Johnson, not as a Judge: The English 
language can be extremely treacherous, and some of these 
interrogatories — this is merely my observation as a 
student of the language of the law -- are not well phrased 
in my opinion as a lawyer, not as a Judge. 
"State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser-Jeep 
Corporation tested for or otherwise evaluated the effect 
of the short wheelbase," and so forth. 
Can you answer that yes or no, Mr. Jensen? 
MR. JENSEN: No. We don't understand the 
questionc We have testing reports which have been made 
available for months. If those -- if that is what they 
are asking for. 
MR. JOHNSON: It can1t be that tough. The 
10. 
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interrogatories, maybe some of them are not well phrased, 
simply ask for, "Did you ever test for the effect of the 
short wheelbase on these jeeps ?!t That is not a hard 
question. 
THE COURT: I will not make an order on 
twenty-seven, except I will grant you permission to seek 
the information you seek by interrogatory number twenty-
seven after you have clarified precisely what it is you 
are asking. 
„ Twenty-eighto 
MRo JENSEN: I think if they will look at 
the reports we have that may satisfy them. Tell them to 
look at them. 
THE COURT: Then when he phrases it properly 
you can identify which reports he has and then you have got 
that done. 
MRo JOHNSON: Twenty-eight is linked to 
twenty-seven, Judge. It's the same sort of question. If 
you answer it in the affirmative tell us what tests you 
have --
THE COURT: I will make the same order on 
twenty-eight as I did on twenty-seven. 
Twenty-nine. 
How many interrogatories are there here? 
MR. JOHNSON: I think about forty something. 
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THE COURT: I have been informed --
MR. JOHNSON: Forty-three. 
THE COURT: -- that the Supreme Court of 
Wyoming has made an order limiting interrogatories to 
thirty-seven with no sub-questions. I sent for a copy of 
that order. I am going to present it to the Supreme Court 
of this State for their consideration. 
MR. JOHNSON: Judge, twenty-nine and thirty 
is exactly the same question, except it asks for "Have 
you ever conducted tests as it relates to the track width 
on the Jeep?" 
THE COURT: I will make the same order on 
that as I made on twenty-seven. 1 am going to give a time 
limit on presenting the interrogatory and the answer. I 
am going to give time limits. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. Twenty-nine and thirty 
would both be the same, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right, I will make the same 
order. You need not answer any further than he has .here, 
but you may polish up your question and be more precise 
in what you are asking for specific, Mr. Johnson. 
MR0 JOHNSON: All right. Thirty-one and 
thirty-two. 
THE COURT: There is an absence of spec-
ificity in these interrogatories generally. 
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MR. JOHNSON: Okay, thirty-one and thirty-
two are the suspension system, and these are the same 
questions. 
THE COURT: I will make the same order on 
those. 
Thirty-three. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thirty-three is the same 
question. I would submit that it doesn't have the problem. 
They understand as an industry testing and evaluating --
THE COURT: He answered it. He's answered 
that one specifically. He says "no". , 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. All right. Look at 
his answer. It says, "No such tests have been located." 
THE COURT: Why shouldn't I consider that 
answer simply, Mr. Jensen, as "no"' period? 
MR. JENSEN: Yes, I think that is the same. 
We are trying to be perfectly candid on what we have and 
what we don't have. We have looked. If there is something 
in some dusty warehouse fifteen years old --
THE COURT: For the purposes of the trial 
I will consider that answer as "no" period. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you. That takes care 
of thirty-four, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thirty-five? 
MR. JOHNSON: It takes care of thirty-five. 
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Thirty-five would also be a no. 
THE COURT: Thirty-six. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay, it would be the same. 
If he answers "no" to that first one they are "no" --
THE COURT: That takes- care of thirty-six. 
Thirty-seven? 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay now, thirty-seven if 
Mr. Jensen will let that answer be he knows of no one who 
is a president or former employee who participated in the 
test driving, which apparently the answer indicates, that 
is fine with us. 
THE COURT: HeTs answered it. He is bound 
by his answerc 
MR, JOHNSON: All right. Now on to thirty-
eight. 
THE COURT: I will sustain his objection to 
that. 
Thirty-nine? That takes care of thirty-nine also. 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor, it would. 
THE COURT: Forty. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. Now that one I would 
submit is clear and ought to be answered. In other words, 
the way he answers that, Judge, he says there is warning 
in the ownerfs manual. Okay, we have got the ownerfs 
manual. The question is did you ever promulgate any warnings 
14. 
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-.cher to Jeep dealers or direct distribution to consumers 
8
 _:out handling characteristics. 
j THE COURT: Can't you answer that yes or 
4 r.c, Mr. Jensen? 
r MR, JENSEN: I think we would stand on our 
$ cr.swer. I guess the problem these folks back at American 
7 cave is the problems related to handling safety rules. 
I THE COURT: I will grant you that is pretty 
* -ague. 
10 MRe JENSEN: It's a vague question. We will 
H ."land on our answer. 
12 THE COURT: He is standing on his answer, 
13 Mr. Johnson0 That takes care of forty-one. 
14 MR. JOHNSON: Forty-one he is saying the 
15 only things they ever sent was the owner's manual. 
16 THE COURT: -I will hold that to the owner's 
17 manual. 
12 Forty-two. 
1* MR. JOHNSON: I take it if he stands on his 
2C answer that all the tests that he has that relates to 
21 chose items we ask for in forty-two are in the documents 
22 chat he has and has provided us. 
23 MR. JENSEN: Yes. 
2* THE COURT: Okay, you have got the answer 
25 then. 
15. 
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1 MR, JOHNSON: Right. 
2 THE COURT: Forty-three. 
3 MRc JOHNSON: Okay, that would take care of 
4 forty-three. Everything he has is produced. 
5 I THE COURT: That takes care of the answers 
6 to interrogatories. 
7 Let's see where we are next. I repeat, I am probably 
8 committing all kinds of error here, gentlemen, but this 
9 case -- that takes care of the plaintiffs third motion 
10 for an order compelling discovery. 
IT The next motion is Defendant American Motor's motion 
12 for leave to file a counterclaim. Is it a counterclaim 
13 or cross-claim? 
14 MR. JENSEN: It's a counterclaim, Your Honor, 
15 seeking --
16 THE COURT: When was this case filed? 
17 November 21st, 1979 c When was your motion for leave to 
18 file a counterclaim filed? 
19 MRo JENSEN: I have that date, Your Honor. 
20 Just a second. 
21 THE COURT: I am not going through these 
22 files and look for them. 
23 MRo JENSEN: No, I can sift through this. 
24 The 12th of August, f 8 2 . This was the same counterclaim 
25 against the Plaintiff Mrs. Whitehead that the other 
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1 HOWARD. LEWIS & PETERSEN 
""* ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
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P»ROVO. UTAH 8 4 6 0 1 
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9 
10 
ii 
12 
Attorneys for_ 
D I S T R I C T COURT OF UTAH COU 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD AND STEVEN 
/WHITEHEAD, 
|! P l a i n t i f f s , 
!! vs • 
i ; 
jiLARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE 
jlANNUITV L I F E INSURANCE COMPANY 
jjANU AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORA-
T I O N , J E E P CORPORATION, I! 
De r e n a a n t s . 
INTERROGATORIES 
TO DEFENDANT AMERICAN MOTORS 
Civil No. 5*,036 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
; Plaintiffs submit herewith the following interrogatories to be 
(answered by the defendant accotding to the provisions of Rule 33 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure under oath and within thirty (30) 
(days of service hereof. These interrogatories are intended to be 
Continuing so as to require a supplementation of response to the 
ifuil extent required in Rule 26(e),of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
i DEFINITIONS 
I The definitions set forth below shall be used for the purposes 
pi these interrogatories. 
' 1. The term "you" or "your" shall mean and include the defen-
dant and any employee, officer, agent, attorney or other individual 
Ijunder tne control of American Motors Corporation, Jeep Corporation. 
i| 2. The term "document" snail mean and include any letter, 
jfcelegram, note, memorandu, record, operating statement, balance 
ijsheet, budget, contract, invoice, order, memorandum of any tele-
phone or personal conference or conversation, inter-office memoran-
esa 
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2 ji: jr.- or or conversation 
4 jjtion and any other writing of any nature, however produced or repro-
5 Ijduced, including copies of sue:: documents (excepting t::cse documents 
litigation.) 
te: rr docu-
8 jpents, snail iequi tne atienaan: tc state wit leaaro to eacr. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
document so aesigr.st-rc;: 
a. The date of tne documents; 
b. The desc! iptior. of tne document in sufficient detail 
to enable it tc oe specifically identified? 
c. Tn- na^e or the Swtno: of tiie document; 
zS 
U •> 
» * 
K< 5 
U n * _ n 
C «c 5 o 5 
3 " m • " 
°-2x«2« 
* * ? : " £ 2izsZ 
^3g»5 5 
W Q « 0 Q 0 
2 • w ? 2 
523 *-
aceress of tne persons presently 14 f d. The nam* and husin-
15 jinaving custody of the documents; 
15 i; e. The name and D J S ir.ess address of each person having 
i' 
17 knowledge of any factual assertions reflected in said document; 
i; 
1 8 jj f. The name of each recipient of the document; 
n 
19 i  g. A statement explaining in reasonable detail the con-
20 iitents of the document. 
The term "identifv" when used m referring to individuals 
22 -jor business entities snail mean and require the defendant to state 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
with regard to each individual so designated: 
a. The name of tne individual or business entity; 
b. The present office or home address; 
d. The individual's present employer. 
5. The term "identify" when used in relation to the terms 
"test", "studies", or "evaluations", shall require the defendant 
with regard to each test, study or evaluation so designated: 
a. The approximate date such tests, studies or evaluation: 
were accomplished; 
b. The names and addresses of the personnel who con-
23y 
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IIor evaluations; 
$ |i e. The names a:-? addresses of the oesonnei who oreoared 
ii . ' 
7 lior authoreo tne documents mer.tiop.e~. in suopa:ac:apn c aocve; 
5ii?* 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
is* 
^ 5 * of ug to 2
 2 
•-a^ss 
*si:xg 
« 2 z o 5 w 
SSgfSj 
aa:°.gl 
s-i 
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> e OP 
f. The present location, ar.z name of the custodian of sue 
document mentioned in subparagraph d a:ove and attach copies. 
6. Each paragraph and subparagraph of these interrogatories 
snail be construed independently anc not by reference to any otner 
paragraph or suoparagrapn? for purposes of limitation. 
IIsTERKOGATOK IES 
" i : 
14i! 1. Please identity tne person answering these interrogatories 
X5 :<and his relationship or position with defendant. 
ii 
16 jj 2. With regard to all Jeep Commando vehicles manufactured oy 
17 i'the defendant American Motors Company or its subsidiary Jeep 
ij 
18 ''Corporation for the model years 1970-1973, please furnish the 
19 '.'.number of all owner reports or consumer complaints from all sources 
20 jieither received by American Motors or of which American Motors is 
21l'iaware, alleging injury or fatality as a result of the malfunction 
ii 
22 lior lack of (1) a safety roil bar, or (2) non-rigid cab enclosures, 
ij 
23 liinciucinq both non-rigid roofs and doors. Include all reports or 
24 ncomplaints, whether or not they have Deer, verified by American Mote 
25 ij 3. With respect to each owner report or consumer complaint 
26 !!* sf erred to in answer to the previous interrogatory, please identi: 
27 Itne contents of each and every document in accordance with the def 
28|rritions preceding these interrogatories. 
29 ij 4. Please furnish the number of all owner reports or consume 
J! 
30 jjcompiaints from a l l sources e i ther received by American Motors 
jj 
31 lior of which American Motors is otherwise aware alleqina iniurv or 
!! - - - -
32 'Ifatality resulting from on-road accidents involving toil-over of 
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4 ji 5. With respect to each owner report or consumer complaint 
5 preferred to in answe: to trie pi-rviou?. interrogatory, identify tne 
6 Ijcontents of eac.n and every document in dccorcs.ncc witn tne deiim-
|! 
!! 
8 !ia cow 
me ce s ic?na tec 
Witr. reaard to tne ac > i tatanti* 
10 {identified in an answei to interrogato:ies ?2 and 4, specify what 
11^investigations American Motors Corocration undertook in reaard to 
i . " 
12 jieach of sa id a c c i d e n t s . 
li 
1 3 ij 7 . I f Ame i l e a n Mo t o r • c not under zar.e : o a t i o n oi 
z*< 
U -> 
» l - t 
c< £ 
W » B . B 
K « 5 5 " 
tat 0 <o o n 
• • a ? ? ; ; 
2 = Z o < " 
5S§ -S« 
U Q n 0 a o 
Q - < ! l o Q a w s 2 
e >
 0 a- " 
5 z 2 
5 a 
81 
JL** liotne: a c t i o n witr. l e g a i c tc tne a c c i c e n t s , i n j u r i e s anchor t a t a . i t i e 
15 i;identif ied in i n t e r r o g a t e ! i e s *s 2 and 4 out nas access to i n v e s t ! -
16 ligations under taken bv Jeep Coroo ra t i on invo lv ing Jeeo Commando 
i; * . " 
17 jjvehicies for tne model years 1970-73 involving tne conditions identi 
18 ijfied in interrogatories #2, and 4 please identify the contents of 
19 
20 
ieacn and every such document in accordance with the definitions 
jpreceding tnese interrogatories, or in tne alternative, attach a cop 
21 iiof said documents. 
oJ 
2A j; 8. Identifv all lawsuits, botn oendma and ciosea cv title, 
o- I' 
£0I court, location and docket numoer m which American Motors or Jeep 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
iCorporation is oi was a defendant against allegations of malfunction 
jot failure of the types listed in interrogatories #2 and 4 involving 
Jeep Commando vehicles for the model years 1970-73. 
9. Identify all claims, both pending and closed, by name and 
address of the claimant in which American Motors was requested to 
pay damages because of allegations of malfunction or failure of the 
types indicated in interrogatories #1, 2 and 4. 
10. State what amount, if any, American Motors paid on each oi 
ithe claims identified in tne previous interrogatory. 
-4- 241 
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». w . i a . 2 jipe: sons at ^ - : :ca:-. .MO^O: 
4 ilGive tne approximate d a t e when sa id des ign changes were accomplished 
6 
7 
8 
9 
io | 
n 
12 
12. Identify tne plans, engineering d: awing.-:, c i u e p r m t s ar 
.n tne production and assemoiy stages £31 tne following component 
)f the Jeep Commando automobile for tne model years 19 7G-7 3: 
a. Tne roof e n c l o s u i e ; 
b . * The wheel Dase and dr i v e - t i a m ; 
c . The t r a c k width of ootn f ron t and tea r a x l e s ; 
d. Anv r o i l bar 01 o tner p r o t e c t i v e device designed tc 
13 liprevent roof c o l l a p s e ; 
i ! 
in + _ 
ff< £ 
H £ £
 0 n ki 0 0 e « 
" • a ? * ! : 
• S S : x e 
S 3 g " 5 ; 
• i S o ; ' 
o * ' *• < 
g ? S I 
11= 
Si 
1 4 j ! e. Steering mechanism; 
ij 
15 ;: f. Stabiizei bars; 
1! . • • 
15 !• a. Suspension systems; 
17 |in. Brakes. 
18|l 13. With regard to the documents referred to in the previous |i 
19 iiinterrogatory, identify in accordance with the definitions preceding 
II 
20 jthese interroaatories the names and addresses of the person, persons 
|i 
21 ijor, group of persons who autnored, prepared, supervised and approved 
22 
23 
24 
25 
25 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
trie documents. 
14. State whether Amei ican Motors has access to documents wrier! 
reflect testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commando automocile 
;for the model years 19~0-73 which determined tne approximate or 
exact position of the center of aravity fo: said vehicles under 
(different passenger load conditions. 
15. If the answer to the previous interrogatory was in the 
jaffirmative, please state the approximate, or if known, the exact 
location of the center of gravity in the Jeep Commando automobiles 
[produced for the model years 1970-73 inclusive, for passenger load 
32 ({Conditions varying from 0-4 passengers inclusive, or in the alter-
242 
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:e L:*e approxima: 2 | 
4 Ijdistr ioution pattern in the automobiles for 
17. y ne tn e r Ame i i c a r. Mo t o i ; 
racn mocei. 
.ion nss access to 
6 ijdjcuments whirr, reflect testinc b>- tr. 
I 
7 !j Commando automobile ror the mocel yea 
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8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
tendency of said automooile to eithei understeer or oversteei ac 
different operating conditions. 
! 18. If tne answer to the preceding interrogatory was in 
the affirmative, identify such documents m accordance witn the 
(definitions preceding these interrogatories or in the alternative 
attach a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories. 
19. State wnetnei American Motors Corporation i,as access to 
15 ^documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep 
16 iiCommando automooile for the mocei years 19~u-73 evaluating the 
17 (Operational directional stability or handling characteristics of 
13 
19 
20 
tsaid automobile under real or simulated cross wind conditions. 
j 
I 20. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in tne 
i 
iaffirmative, identify such documents and/or evaluations in accordance 
(with the def in i t ions preceding these in te r roga tor ies or in the 
22 ijal tetnative attach a copy of the same to your answers to interroga-
23 iltor ies. 
j! 
24 !| 21. State wnether American Motors Corporation has access to 
25 (documents reflectina testing bv Jeec Corooration of the Jeeo 
l 
26 iiCommando automobile for tne model years 1970-73 evaluating the 
27 laero-dynamic stability of said automobiles, 
ij 
28 jj 22. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
29.. affirmative, please identify such documents in accordance with the 
i 
30 definitions preceding these interrogatories or in the alternative 
31 ilattach a copy of same to vour answers to interrogatories. 
jj 
32:; 23. State what instructions were i n d u c e d in any manual or 
243 
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2 I 'Jeeo Commando, VI-\ JLA 67K VK2I3G9, wr.icr. s t a t e d any p a r t i c u l a r 
3 jivM oDxer- or p r i c i e x s r e l a t i n g t o v t . ' . i c i t nand* i r .g cr.ai a c t e : . = *_-•: = 
4 llwhich miant be encountered in d r i v i n c or o o e r a t m a sa id automcbi l e s . 
|! " 
C d I ' ' - - , '
 4 
5 iiFlease outline m detail sucr. instructions or attacn £ corv ~:-:e:ecr. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
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24. State wnetner Ar.ei:car. Motors Corporation nas access tc 
ijdocunients reflecting nesting cy Jccc Ccrpoiation of tne Jeep I or.;:', an 
jautomoDiie for tne model years 1970-73 evaluating tne effect of 
isafety toll bars in said automobiles as related to tne prevention o 
Iunysical injuries and/or fatalities to the passengers in said 
jautomobiles in tne event of a roil-over or otner accident. 
25. If the answer to tne previous interrogatory is in tne 
ijarf irmative, identify such documents in accordance witr. the defini-
14 !;t ions preceding these interrogatories or in tne alternative attacr. 
15 j>a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories. 
16 !; 26. State whether American Motors Corporation nas access to 
17 jjdocuments reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commandq 
18 [.automobile for model years 1970-73 evaluating the effect of the short 
ft 
19 jjwheel base of said automobile on its resistance to roil-over. 
20 27. If the answer to the previous interroaatorv is in the 
21 Ijaff irmative, identify sucn documents in accordance with the defini- j 
CO !l • - • • - • 
*^ it ions orececmg tnese interrogatories or m tne alternative attacn a { 
23 jjcopy of same to your answers to interrogatories. 
24 ij 28. State whether American Motors Corporation has access to 
25 (documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commandd 
25 
27 
28 
29 
iutomobiie for model vea r s 1970-73 e v a i u a t i n a the e f f e c t tne 
itrack width of the Jeep Commando automobile on its resistance to 
|r oil-over . 
29. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
30 jiaff irmative, identify such documents in accordance with the 
«1 definitions preceding these interrogatories, or in the alternative, 
32 ijattach a copy of same to your answers tc interrogatories. 
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2 documents reflecting testinc :v Jeep Cc: pc: atior. of tne Jeep Command: 
4 'suspension systeir of the Jeec Commando automobile on its resistance 
5 lite rcii-ovej . jj 
6 jj 31. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in tne 
7 .isff i: m-tive , identify sue:: documents m accoijc::^ with tne 
8 ;idef initior.F piecedinc these interioaatories, or in tne alternative, 
9jattach a copy of same to youi answers to interrogatories. 
10 I 32. State whether American Motors Corporation has access to 
11 (documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commandc 
12 'for tne model vears 1970-73 evaluatina the strength and/or crash-
z? 
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13 j|w jf tne cat- e n c l o s u r e s u t i l i z e d in tne o roduc t ion of sa id 
1<± i iautomociies. 
i: \ 
15 • 33. If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in tne 
16 jiaffirmative, identify such documents in accordance with tne 
17 ndefinitions preceding these interrogatories, or in the alternative, 
IS jjattach a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories. 
19 !; 34. If the answer to interrogatory #33 is in the affirmative, 
V 
H 
20 jjstate in addition whether American Motors Corporation has access to 
21•documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commando 
22 | automobile for model vears 1970-~3 evaluating the potential for ij 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
ohysicai injury and/or fatality resulting from the cab enclosure of 
said automobile, if said automobile were incvived in an accident. 
35. If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, please identify such documents in accordance with the 
definitions preceding these interrogatories, or in the alternative, 
attach a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories. 
36. State whether American Motors Corporation has access to 
30 ijdocuments in the possession of Jeep Corporation reflecting the 
31 [.-identity of all present or former employees of American Motors 
|i 
32^Corporation who participated in the actual test-driving of the Jeep 
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3 j |a i 11r r r .a t ive , acicur.'c.'. 'c ir. accoi 'cancfc 
i 
4 'idef m i t i o n s oiecedinc these inter roaatoi ies , 01 in the alternative, 
5 'attach a copv of the sane to voui answei s to interrogatories. 
6 J 3b. State wnet.nei Ameiican Motors Corporation has access to 
7 '-'docuir^ r* = : ^ -.-ctinc the identities of tne enc .nee: m-2 firms annoi 
il 
8 j j indiv idual e n c m e e r s r e s p o n s i b l e ror tne a e s i c n or tne wneei o a s e , 
9 
10 
11 
track width, suspension system, and cac enclosures for tne Jeep 
Commando automobile. 
i 39. If tne answer to tne previous interrogatory was in the 
z! 
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12 Ijaf f irmative, identify such documents in accordance with the cefini-
13 jjtions regarding the identification of persons which precede these 
I; 
14 ;;mte: roqatoi ies . 
DATED this » Q day of September, 1961. 
n 
tz i 
15 
16 
17 
IS 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
25 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
?Kf 
?Z. ^  AA 
IHARD 5. JOHNSOy ror: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
!| WAILED a copy of the foregoing Interrogatories to Mr. Jay E. 
jjJensen, Attorney for defendant Jeep Corporation, 900 Reams Bldg., 
ji 
ibalt Lake City, Utah 84101; Mi. Timotny R. Hanson, Attorney for 
VALIC, 650 Clark Learning Office Center, 173 South West Temple, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101; Mr. Thomas A. D u f f m , Attorney for Defendant 
JAnderson, Ten West Broadway Bldg., Suite 510, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101; Mr. Glen Hanni, Attorney at Law, 600 Boston Bldg., Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111; dated this 1 ^ clay of September, 1981c 
-9-
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